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It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle
Over Cryptographic Key "Escrow"
A. Michael Froomkint
The emergence of cryptography as an integral part of modem
communications and data storage creates dilemmas for govern-
ment policy makers. The national interest is clearly well served
when citizens have access to secure telecommunications and data
storage.1 The increased use of computers and computer-aided
communications such as local area networks ("LANs") and the
Internet means that digitized data plays an increasing role in
modern life. This digitized data-which can be anything from
business's most valuable trade secrets to copyrighted music to
intensely personal information-is particularly vulnerable data:
it is easy to copy, and often relatively easy to access also. Routine
use of encryption means that businesses are better protected
against industrial espionage by competitors and foreign govern-
ments.2 It reduces information theft and attacks by "hackers" or
t © A. Michael Froomkin, 1997. All rights reserved. Associate Professor, University
of Miami School of Law. Internet: froomkin@law.miami.edu. Caroline Bradley, Carl
Ellison, Tim Philp, Mark Rotenberg, and Willis Ware made helpful comments at the
outline stage; Dorothy Denning and Carl Ellison provided helpful technical information;
Brooks Fudenburg, Patrick Gudridge, and Adam Smith made helpful comments on an
earlier draft; none should be assumed to necessarily agree with my analysis or conclu-
sions. Thank you to SueAnn Campbell and Nora de la Garza for library support and to
Rosalia Lliraldi for secretarial assistance.
I am grateful to Larry Lessig and the University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting
me to participate in the Law of Cyberspace symposium. I particularly want to acknowl-
edge the editors of the Legal Forum for tolerating my desire to present an up-to-date
account of a rapidly changing subject. Thus, although a preliminary draft was delivered in
Chicago on November 4, 1995, unless otherwise noted this Article attempts to reflect
legal, political, and technical developments as of July 15, 1996.
At the request of the National Research Council I reviewed an early draft of its re-
port on cryptography policy, which is discussed in this article, and submitted comments to
the Committee.
See National Research Council, Kenneth Dam and Herb Lin, eds, Cryptography's
Role in Securing the Information Society 22-50 (National Academy Press, 1996) ("CRISIS
Report"). The National Research Council is part of the National Academy of Sciences.
2 National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Eco-
nomic Collection and Industrial Espionage 15 (1996). According to FBI Director Louis
Freeh, the governments of at least 20 nations are "actively engaged in economic espio-
nage." Louis J. Freeh, Address at the Executives' Club of Chicago 8 (Feb 17, 1994) (tran-
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saboteurs who could theoretically disrupt banking and finance,
utilities including telecommunications and the power grid, and
even components of the national defense.3 Encryption also en-
hances the ability of citizens to protect their privacy against
intrusions ranging from illegal government investigations to nosy
relatives.
The greatest dilemma arises from the fact that techniques
that protect against illicit eavesdropping and data theft also
threaten to prevent licit access to communications and data by
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.4 The policy dilemma
is especially acute in the United States because widespread en-
cryption imposes a particularly severe cost on U.S. intelligence-
gathering capabilities. (I use "capability" throughout this Article
to mean physical ability, not legal ability. Thus, for example,
anyone with a gun who can get within range has the capability of
shooting me. That doesn't mean they legally can, morally should,
or likely will.) U.S. electronic-intelligence capabilities are pre-
sumed to be the best in the world; if so, the U.S. has the most to
lose from a move towards a world in which communications
traffic is routinely protected with encryption so strong that it
cannot be decrypted easily, and perhaps not at all. Widespread
high-quality encryption not only lessens the U.S. government's
ability to eavesdrop on foreign communications, but threatens to
make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to conduct traffic analysis.
Where once an encrypted message stood out, suggesting that the
sender had something important to hide, now these critical
messages risk being camouflaged in a sea of encrypted data.
Encryption policy also involves a subtle interrelationship
between domestic and foreign policy. Although there are no legal
controls on the production or use of strong cryptographic products
by U.S. citizens or residents within the U.S., these products
script available at the FBI) (excerpts available online at http//www.hotwired.com/clipper/
fbi.quotes.html).
3 See CRISIS Report at 2 (cited in note 1); U.S. General Accounting Office, Informa-
tion Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, GAO/
AIMD-96-84 (May 1996).
Not everyone accepts that the government should have the right to acquire the
contents of personal communications and data. Nevertheless, in this article I will assume
without argument that surveillance and information acquisition conducted pursuant to
the rule of law, such as a valid warrant or other lawful government order, is the legiti-
mate fruit of a legitimate policy choice in a democratic society. From this perspec-
tive-which is surely the perspective of policy makers who have the duty of executing
those laws-legitimate national policy is frustrated when a wiretap is thwarted because
the FBI cannot decode the conversation or a search warrant is unproductive because the
police cannot decrypt the suspect's hard drive.
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cannot be exported or sold to foreigners. Export control likely
retards the spread of cryptography in the U.S.5 Conversely,
efforts to preserve the domestic wiretapping and data-search
capabilities of law enforcement by technical means such as the
Clipper chip would risk hampering the sales of U.S. products if
comparable local products that are not wiretap-ready are avail-
able abroad.
At its deepest level, the encryption dilemma implicates
profound questions about the relationships among citizens, and
between the citizen and the state. The fundamental issues re-
volve around trust: whether citizens should be asked to trust the
state with the means of acquiring the citizens' secrets, and
whether the community and the state6 feel they can afford to
allow citizens, as well as foreign citizens and foreign states,
access to technologies that enhance secret-keeping to the point
that police or intelligence agencies might find it impossible to
monitor communications or search a computer's hard drive.
This Introduction will briefly sketch the export-control
regime as it applies to cryptography, and discuss the evolving
goals of U.S. cryptography policy. The three main sections of this
paper are each devoted to a phase of the U.S. government's
recent attempts to keep the cryptography genie in the bottle in
the face of increasing commercial and political pressure to loosen
or abolish cryptographic export control. Part I offers a quick
summary of the late, unlamented Clipper chip initiative.7 Part II
describes the Clinton Administration's proposal for software-
based key "escrow." Part III, the longest part, begins in section A
by discussing recent technical and political changes that make
the current export control policy increasingly difficult to main-
tain. Section B examines the Administration's cryptographic
"White Paper" which proposes legislation to require that the
national information infrastructure be designed to ensure that
any communication, and any transaction, that it facilitates is ex-
posed to possible government monitoring. Section C briefly
surveys international initiatives, at least welcomed and perhaps
See Part I.B.
6 Whether "the state" can usefully be personified, and once so reified can usefully be
said to have interests of its own separate from and perhaps even inimical to the communi-
ty, are problems I must gloss over in this essay.
7 For a fuller description of the Clipper chip and a discussion of the constitutional
issues raised by any attempt to legislate domestic controls on the use of encryption, see A.
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Con-
stitution, 143 U Penn L Rev 709 (1995).
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orchestrated by the United States government, that might result
in transnational controls on the use of strong cryptography by
both citizens and enterprises. Part IV, the conclusion, returns to
the subject of trust and discusses Congress's role in the formation
of a national cryptography policy. A postscript added shortly
before this Article went to press offers a preliminary anlysis of
some features of the Clinton Administration's October 1996
encryption proposal. i
Overall, this Article aims to describe the issues in a rapidly
changing and complex legal and technical debate. It also identi-
fies significant legal and technical issues that current govern-
ment proposals do not resolve. Rather than attempt to prescribe
the content of a solution, however, the prescriptive portion con-
centrates on policy-formation procedures likely to be conducive to
a resolution of the debate.
A. Goals and Challenges for U.S. Crypto Policy
For the past two decades or more, a major goal of U.S.
cryptography policy-to the extent that the U.S. has had
ones-has been to prevent strong mass-market cryptography
from becoming widely available abroad, with export controls
being the primary tool used to achieve this end. Primary respon-
sibility for determining export-control policy fell to the National
Security Agency, which determined policy in part in consultation
with other participants in the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
lateral Export Controls ("COCOM") group.9 At home, the govern-
ment has pursued a more schizophrenic policy, seemingly torn
between embracing the benefits of cryptography for domestic se-
curity and the national economy,' ° while simultaneously being
' The "goals of U.S. cryptography policy have not been explicitly formalized and artic-
ulated within the government." CRISIS Report at Part II (cited in note 1); see also id at
xiv (statement by Kenneth Dam noting absence of national policy).
' U.S. Department of Commerce and National -Security Agency, A Study of the
International Market for Computer Software With Encryption 11-2 (1996) ("Export Study").
COCOM disbanded in 1994.
'0 For example, in 1977 the U.S. government adopted the Digital Encryption Stan-
dard ("DES") as a cipher certified as sufficiently strong for domestic business use. DES,
issued as FIPS ("Federal Information Processing Standard") 46 in January 1977, was
reviewed, slightly revised, reaffirmed for federal government use in 1983 and 1987, and
reissued as FIPS 46-1 in January 1988; on September 11, 1992, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ('NIST") announced a third review of FIPS 46-1, DES, and
reaffirmed it for another five years as FIPS 46-2. See Revision of Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standard (FIPS) 46-1 Data Encryption Standard (DES), 58 Fed Reg 69,347,
69,347-48 (1993). Export of DES remains controlled under the ITAR to this day, which
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unwilling to accept that the natural consequence of this policy is
a reduction in the wiretapping and electronic investigatory
powers of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These
conflicting goals culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to con-
vince the public to accept the Clipper chip, a device that offered
the user superior encryption capabilities at the price of ensuring
continued government access to encrypted communications.11
Although the Clipper chip failed to catch on, the long-term
policy of which it is a part seems to have accomplished at least
its objective of playing for time. Export control rules have had an
effect on the domestic market for products with cryptographic
capabilities such as e-mail, operating systems, and word proces-
sors. Largely because of the ban on export of strong cryptogra-
phy, there is today no strong mass-market standard cryptograph-
ic product within the U.S. even though a considerable mathemat-
ical and programming base is fully capable of creating one.
Windows 95, for example, does not come with cryptographic
capabilities.
There are many cryptographers and computer hardware and
software vendors outside the U.S., but U.S. companies such as
Microsoft have large and often dominant market shares in impor-
tant world markets: notably operating systems, word processors,
e-mail systems, spreadsheets, and groupware. 2 A policy that
affects the U.S. software industry thus has world-wide conse-
quences which are felt at home as well as abroad. Export controls
are ostensibly aimed only at foreigners. There are no legal re-
strictions on the domestic purchase or use of strong cryptography
by U.S. citizens and permanent residents.13 But by preventing
the export of strong cryptography, the government slows its
domestic use because many U.S. software vendors are reluctant
to produce different domestic and export versions of their prod-
ucts. 14 Most manufacturers profess to believe that foreign cus-
tomers will resent, and perhaps reject, a "crippled" export version
means that anyone seeking to export a DES product needs permission. Banks and other
U.S. corporations seeking export clearance for DES products for internal use routinely re-
ceive export permission.
' See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 744 (cited in note 7).
See Export Study at ES-2 (cited in note 9) (noting that the "overwhelming majority
(75%) of general-purpose software programs... available on foreign markets today are of
U.S. origin").
"' The Arms Export Control Act requires manufacturers of "munitions" (which are de-
fined to include cryptography) to register with the State Department. 22 USC § 2778
(1988 & Supp IV 1992).
" See Export Study at V-4 (cited in note 9).
20 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
of a product and say they therefore choose to have one standard
version for all countries. 5 Software makers wish to minimize
the number of versions of their products so as to make main-
tenance and upgrading as simple as possible. As a result of these
commercial and practical constraints, the U.S. mass market has
ended up with the same relatively weak cryptography that the
U.S. government permits to be exported.
Cryptographic algorithms ordinarily use a key to encrypt a
message. Standard, single-key ciphers use the same key to
encrypt and decrypt a message. Some modern public-key ciphers
use two keys, each of which encrypts messages that can only be
decrypted by the other. All other things being equal, 6 the
strength of a secure cryptographic algorithm is proportional to
the length of the key used to encrypt messages, a figure that is
usually expressed in bits. Data Encryption Standard ("DES"), the
official U.S. encryption standard, which is not freely exportable
but has for some time been the de facto international standard
also, uses fifty-six-bit keys, although there is reason to doubt that
DES is sufficiently strong to prevent a reasonably determined
attacker with a fast computer from decrypting a DES message in
minutes. 7 The domestic versions of Netscape World Wide Web
browsers use one hundred twenty-eight-bit keys when in secure
mode. In contrast, the export versions of Netscape use relatively
weak, forty-bit encryption because longer keys would require an
export license. 8
15 "[T]he market reality is that a side-by-side comparison of two products identical ex-
cept for their domestic vs. exportable encryption capabilities always results in a market
assessment of the stronger products as providing a 'baseline' level of security and the
weaker one being inferior, rather than the weaker product providing the baseline and the
stronger one being seen as superior." CRISIS Report at 315 n 6 (cited in note 1); but see
remarks of Ray Ozzie, http'//www.lotus.com/notesr4/ozzie.htm (Jan 17, 1996) (describing
"Differential Workfactor Cryptography" in which export editions of Lotus Notes are
shipped with sixty-four-bit encryption enabled, but with twenty-four-bits encrypted in a
LEAF-like data tag accessible to the U.S. government; as a result, the government need
do no more brute-force work to decrypt the message than would be needed for a message
using forty-bit encryption).
'" For a discussion of the things assumed away in this magic phrase, see generally
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed 1996).
17 See, for example, Matt Blaze, et al, Minimal Key Lengths For Symmetric Ciphers
To Provide Adequate Commercial Security, http'//www.bsa.org/bsa/cryptologists.html (Jan
1996) (stating that "U.S. Data Encryption Standard with 56-bit keys is increasingly inade-
quate").
," CRISIS Report at 4-11 n 24 (cited in note 1). For a discussion of the forty-bit limit,
and the various demonstrations of the amount of computer power required to brute-force
decrypt messages encrypted with forty-bit keys, see The RSA Encryption Page, http'//
www.library.carleton.edu/studentworkers/dan/rsa.html.
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B. Export Control: The ITAR
The export of strong cryptographic tools from the U.S. is
governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
("ITAR")."9 The ITAR control the export of items listed on the
U.S. Munitions List ("USML") and are administered by the Office
of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State. The
Commerce Department administers the Export Administration
Regulations ("EAR"), which regulate the export of so-called "dual-
use" items listed on the Commerce Control List ("CCL").2 ° Prod-
ucts offering data authentication, password protection, and access
control are usually listed on the CCL. As an initial matter,
products capable of encrypting a message are listed on the USML
unless the product is restricted to financial uses such as ATMs.
However, the State Department has the authority to transfer ju-
risdiction over export applications for any encryption product to
the Commerce Department, and sometimes does so in a Commod-
ity Jurisdiction ("CJ") determination, if it determines that the
product no longer needs case-by-case review. Products that fall
under the EAR can be exported under a general license; products
that fall under the ITAR need a separate license application and
review which ordinarily involves a referral to the Defense De-
partment and the National Security Agency. The State Depart-
ment routinely transfers jurisdiction over cryptographic products
that use keys of forty bits or less to the Commerce Department
"after a one-time review to ensure that the algorithm is imple-
mented properly."21 Exactly why the threshold is set at forty bits
is unclear. "Most likely, it was the result of a set of compromises
that were politically driven by all of the parties involved."2"
" See 22 CFR § 121.1 (XIII)(b)(1) (1994). The statutory authority for the ITAR is the
Arms Export Control Act, codified as amended at 22 USC § 2778 (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
For a thorough survey of the ITAR and associated regulations, see Fred Greguras, Regula-
tion Update on U.S. Software Exports, httpJ/www.graphcomp.com/info/crypt/us-.regs.html.
20 The statutory authority for the EAR is the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50
USC app §§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which lapsed on August 20, 1994. See 50
USCA app § 2419 (West Supp 1994). President Clinton issued an executive order requir-
ing that the EAR be kept in force to "the extent permitted by law" under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 USC §§ 1701-1706 (1988 & Supp IV
1992). See Continuation of Export Control Regulations, Exec Order No 12924, 59 Fed Reg
43437 (1994). President Clinton recently extended the state of emergency required to ac-
tivate his authority under IEEPA; see Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export
Control Regulations, 61 Fed Reg 42527 (August 15, 1996).
21 See Export Study at II-1 to 11-2 (cited in note 9).
'2 See CRISIS Report at 122 (cited in note 1).
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Under the current ITAR regime, applications to export
cryptographic software designed to encrypt messages with keys
stronger than forty bits are generally denied, although authenti-
cation products that cannot be adapted for encryption, or which
are designed for specific favored applications such as banking,
tend to receive official export clearance.23 Applications to export
DES,24 which uses fifty-six-bit encryption, are also often de-
nied." Applications for stronger products are considered to have
little chance of approval. In theory, export controls are intended
to prevent foreigners from acquiring cryptographic systems that
are strong enough to create a serious barrier to traffic analysis,
or that are difficult to crack.2" In practice, although the ITAR
have failed to prevent the spread of strong cryptogra-
phy-algorithms and software created in the United States
routinely and quickly find their way abroad, and foreigners
create their own-the ITAR are widely considered to have pre-
vented the emergence of a mass-market, international standard,
cryptographic product.27
Indeed, uncertainty as to whether a given cryptosystem
would be approved for export discourages software manufacturers
from including strong cryptography." The conventional wisdom
in the highly competitive software industry holds that any delay
may be fatal to a new product's marketability. Routine export
applications are approved quickly, but an ambitious application
can meander though the administrative appeals process.3" Since
the government's objection to the export of products using keys in
23 See Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Information
Security and Privacy in Network Environments 154 (1994); see also U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, Communications Privacy: Federal Policy and Actions 6-7, 24-28 (1993).
24 See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 735-38 (cited in note 7) (discussing how DES
became a standard in the United States). Exports to Canada are not controlled.
2 See, for example, Trusted Information Systems, Press Release, TIS GauntletTM
Firewall with 56-bit DES approved for U.S. Export, http://www.tis.com/docs/corporate/
press/vpnpr.html (stating that TIS is first company to get U.S. export permision for DES-
based firewall product).
" See Susan Landau, et al, Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy 25
(Association for Computing Machinery, 1994) ("ACM Report").
27 See Export Study at 111-9 (cited in note 9); CRISIS Report at 128 (cited in note 1).
2 Export Study at V-4 (cited in note 9); CRISIS Report at 301 (cited in note 1).
29 See generally Tracy Kidder, The Soul of a New Machine (Little, Brown, 1981);
Douglas Coupland, MicroSerfs (Harper Collins, 1995).
30 The record in Karn v United States, 925 F Supp 1 (D DC 1996) (appeal docketed)
provides one, perhaps extreme, example. Karn submitted his original export request on
Feb 12, 1994 and did not emerge from the appeals process with a final decision until June
13, 1995. Id at 2-3. See also Export Study at V-4 (cited in note 9) (citing two-year lead
time to produce new products).
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excess of forty bits, for other than specified exceptions such as
banking or data authentication, is well known in the industry,
many firms do not bother even to apply, and simply produce
products they know can be exported.31 U.S. producers of crypto-
graphic software have become so cynical about the government's
export policy that many declined to respond to a government
survey designed to measure the extent of their concern about
export control "because they were skeptical of efforts by the
Government to accomplish anything of value related to encryp-
tion.o
32
The ITAR are controversial, and suits to have them declared
unconstitutional as applied to the export of cryptographic source
code have been filed in district courts in California and Washing-
ton, D.C. The California court held that an algorithm expressed
in source code is protected speech,33 a ruling that seems to lead
inexorably to a decision that the ITAR are unconstitutional. The
D.C. court dismissed a similar claim on political question
grounds, and the decision is currently being appealed to the D.C.
Circuit. 4
While challenges to the ITAR wend their way towards the
Supreme Court, technical and political developments are conspir-
ing to make current U.S. export-control policy obsolete. The ever-
increasing speed and number of computers make it increasingly
cheap and easy to use brute-force methods to decipher messages
encrypted with any given key length. Longer and longer keys are
thus needed to achieve consistent levels of security, making the
forty-bit limit on freely exportable cryptography increasingly
obsolete. The accelerating digitization of the world increases the
importance of information security. Meanwhile, U.S. dominance
of the supply of strong cryptographic hardware and software may
be about to disappear.
Against this background, the Clinton Administration has
labored mightily to preserve what it can of the data acquisition
capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
" See Export Study at ES-4 (cited in note 9) (noting that companies "avoid [ ] apply-
ing for export licenses"); id at V-4.
3' Id at V-1.
' See Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 922 F Supp 1426 (ND Cal
1996). Further information about this case is available online at http'/www.eff.orgpub/
Privacy/ITARIexport/Bernsteincase/.
' Karn, 925 F Supp 1 (cited in note 30). For full information, including all unsealed
motions, pleadings and evidence, see http//www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export/.
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I. THE CLIPPER CHIP: TECHNICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
INNOVATION
With the Clipper chip the United States government hoped it
had solved the encryption policy dilemma. The government intro-
duced Clipper with an inventive strategy to manipulate informa-
tion-processing standards, circumvent both Congress and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and rig the market for
encryption devices. Despite this, the strategy failed when the
public refused to buy or use the product. A companion product,
the Capstone Chip implemented in the Fortezza card, 5 has
fared somewhat better, but is far from market dominance.
In an effort to ensure the continuation of its law-enforce-
ment-related searching and wiretapping abilities and its espio-
nage-related electronic-eavesdropping capabilities, the govern-
ment devised the Clipper chip36 for secure telephones and the
Capstone Chip-based Fortezza PCMCIA card 7 for secure e-mail
and file encryption. Use of the chips was and is voluntary: U.S.
citizens remain free to use any cipher they wish, so long as the
software or hardware remains in the U.S. In February 1996,
about two years after the Administration originally promised to
promulgate a personal use exception, it became legal to take
strong cryptographic programs abroad, on a laptop computer for
example, for personal use.38 It continues to be illegal to give or
sell strong cryptography to foreigners without first obtaining an
export license, which can be difficult or impossible to obtain.
However, U.S. law currently imposes no restriction on sending
encrypted messages abroad, regardless of the strength of the
encryption. The ITAR prohibit the export of the means to encrypt
messages, not the messages themselves.
Originally available only as a PCMCIA card, Fortezza now comes in an ISA variety
as well. See Fortezza CryptoSecurity Products, http://www.rnbo.com/PROD/CRYPTO.HTM.
A Quicktime Movie of a "virtual Fortezza Card" is offered by Rainbow Technologies,
available online at httpJ/www.rnbo.com/FORTVR.HTM (1996).
The Clipper chip is defined-to the extent it has ever been publicly defined-in the
Escrowed Encryption Standard ("EES"). See Approval of Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 185, Escrowed Encryption Standard ("FIPS 185"), 59 Fed Reg 5997
(1994). 1 discuss the original Clipper chip proposal in A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor
is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Penn L Rev 709
(1995) (cited in note 7).
37 See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 715 n 16 (cited in note 7).
See 61 Fed Reg 6111 (Feb 16, 1996) (personal use exception to ITAR). The regula-
tions, however, impose surprisingly extensive record-keeping requirements on anyone who
takes an encryption program to a foreign country. See id.
' See note 25 and accompanying text.
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In both Clipper and Capstone, the government offered the
public a carrot and a catch. The carrot was that both chips use
SKIPJACK, a classified symmetric-key4 ° encryption algorithm'
with an eighty-bit key. SKIPJACK is certified as reliable by the
NSA and is probably stronger than any alternative using a com-
parable key length; given its longer key length, SKIPJACK is
certainly much stronger than the most widely used symmetric-
key cipher, fifty-six-bit DES.42 Market pressure for a substitute
for DES is building because the cipher is now widely believed to
be too weak for high-security applications due to advances in
computer processing power,43 although DES remains appropri-
ate when very top-quality security is not required.
The catch in Clipper/Capstone was that the government
would keep a copy of the keys-the unique codes belonging to
each chip-thus allowing it to retain the ability to intercept every
message sent using the chip. The government set out relatively
elaborate procedures that it said would reduce the risk that the
keys would be released to law enforcement agencies without
legally sufficient justification, such as a valid wiretap authoriza-
tion," but the long-term efficacy of these procedures was debat-
40 In a symmetric-key system both sender and receiver use the same key to encrypt
and decrypt messages. In public-key systems the sender encrypts messages with a key
that permits decryption only by a different key. Symmetric-key ciphers tend to work much
more quickly than public-key ciphers of equivalent key length, and are thus more suited
to real-time applications such as telephones, or to long documents. Symmetric-key sys-
tems rely on users safeguarding the key-if an interloper gets hold of the key he an
decrypt all the messages encrypted with it. In contrast, public-key systems are more flexi-
ble, since one half of the key pair is secret and the other half can be made public. A mes-
sage encrypted with the public key can only be read by the holder of the private key; if a
message is encrypted with the private key, anyone who has access to the public key can
read it, but the fact that the public key successfully decrypted the message authenticates
it as emanating from the holder of the private key. Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 890-
94 (cited in note 7).
1 An algorithm is a more formal name for a cipher. An algorithm is a mathematical
function used to encrypt and decrypt a message. Modern algorithms use a key to encrypt
and decrypt messages. The number of possible values of a key is called the keyspace.
42 See Gilles Garon & Richard Outerbridge, DES Watch: An Examination of the
Sufficiency of the Data Encryption Standard for Financial Institution Information Security
in the 1990s, Cryptologia 177 (July 1991) (stating that since its adoption in 1977, DES
"has become the most widely used cryptographic system in the world"). A panel of emi-
nent cryptologists selected by the government concluded that SKIPJACK should remain
secure against brute-force attacks, despite continual increases in computing power, for at
least thirty years. See Ernest F. Brickell, et al, SKIPJACK Review Interim Report: The
SKIPJACK Algorithm 1 (July 28, 1993) (available online at http'//www.quadralay.
comlwww/Crypt/Clipper/skipjack-review.html) ("[Tihere is no significant risk that
SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40 years."). The panel
never issued a final report.
,3 See, for example, Blaze, et al, Minimal Key Lengths (cited in note 17).
" The procedures for creating and storing the chip keys in a secure manner are
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ed. Whatever their technical merits, the government's proposals
for safeguarding the keys remained vulnerable to a change in
administration policy. The procedures were not based on any
specific legislative authorization. The agencies that issued the
relevant rules described them as procedural rules, not substan-
tive rules, and issued them without APA notice and comment. As
a result, the government retained the absolute right to change
the rules at any time, perhaps without public notice.45
The Clipper/Capstone proposal was notable for both technical
and bureaucratic innovations. The two most important technical
innovations, other than SKIPJACK itself, were the reliance on
"tamperproof"4 ' hardware to make it difficult to reverse engineer
a chip and construct rogue Clipper telephones or Fortezza PCM-
CIA cards,47 and the construction of "escrow" protocols for the
Clipper and Capstone chips. The bureaucratic innovations were
at least as significant. In the process of bringing forward the
Clipper proposal the federal government defined a federal infor-
mation processing standard that didn't describe a standard, cir-
cumvented both Congress and the Administrative Procedure Act,
and attempted to use government market power to create a de
facto standard because no statute gave it the authority to create
a mandatory standard.
A. Key "Escrow" in Clipper
The Clipper chip makes it possible for the government to
decrypt a telephone call encrypted with a Clipper telephone by
putting essential information into "escrow." The use of the term
escrow is a misnomer, since the "escrow" is for the benefit of law
described in Dorothy E. Denning & Miles Smid, Key Escrowing Today, IEEE Comm 58
(Sept 1994) (available online at http'//guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto/clipper/
Key-Escrowing-Today.txt).
The three sets of procedures for disclosure of keys for use in authorized federal,
state, and national security-related wiretaps appear in Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, Key Escrow Encryption: Announcements-February 4, 1994 (Feb 15, 1994)
(information packet accompanying press release) (on file with the Legal Forum).
45 See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 763 (cited in note 7).
4' See id at 753 n 187 (discussing tamperproof hardware).
17 The dependence of Clipper and other products on "tamper resistant" hardware has
spawned a cottage industry of attempts to subvert such schemes. Notable efforts include
Yair Frankel & Moti Yung, Escrow Encryption Systems Visited: Attacks, Analysis and
Designs in Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '95 Proceedings (1995) (on file with The
Legal Forum, in which the authors describe a practical-sounding method of tricking a
Clipper chip into using another chip's LEAF).
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enforcement, not the parties to the communication, but the term
has achieved wide currency, and we seem to be stuck with it."
Escrow in Clipper works as follows.49 Every Clipper chip
bears a unique serial number and has a unique encryption key
(the "chip-unique key") that is burnt in by the manufacturer
under secure conditions.0 The chip-unique keys are split into
two pieces with each half held by an "escrow agent." Currently
the two escrow agents are NIST, in the Department of Com-
merce, and the Treasury Department's Automated Systems Divi-
sion.5"
When Alice initiates a secure Clipper communication with
Bob, the two Clipper chips first agree on a one-time session key52
for the communication. They then exchange Law Enforcement
Access Fields ("LEAFs"), a stream of bits that carries the data
law enforcement would need to get access to the session key for
that telephone call. To prevent "rogue" encryption, Clipper chips
will not communicate with each other until they exchange valid
LEAFs.s3
Clipper would be worthless if unauthorized users could use
the LEAF to defeat the Clipper chip. To prevent this, the session-
key data in the LEAF is itself buried under two layers of encryp-
tion. First, the chip encrypts the session key with the chip-unique
key. Then the chip appends its unique serial number and a
checksum, and re-encrypts the entire data set with the family
key, a key common to all Clipper chips, but-in theory-known
only to authorized law enforcement personnel.
For a technical survey of the types of "escrowed" encryption systems developed, see
Dorothy E. Denning & Dennis K Branstad, A Taxonomy for Key Escrow Systems, 39
Comm ACM 34, 36 (March 1996) (table entry for Fortezza card); Dorothy E. Denning,
http:/www.cosc.goergetown.edu/~denning/crypto/appendix.html.
" For a more detailed description of the Clipper chip's workings, see Froomkin, 143
U Penn L Rev at 753-59 (cited in note 7).
For details, see Denning & Smid, Key Escrowing Today (cited in note 44).
51 Office of the Press Secretary, Key Escrow Encryption: Announcements (cited in note
44).
,2 A session key is the sequence of bits allowing decryption that will be used for only
a single communication, one e-mail, or one telephone call. Each time the parties initiate a
new conversation, they generate a new session key, which, though lasting for the entire
conversation, is never repeated. See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 754-55 (cited in note
7).
, Matt Blaze's "LEAF-blower" exploited a vulnerability in the LEAF-checking algo-
rithm to generate spurious approvals. of counterfeit LEAFs. The method is too slow,
however, to be of great practical value. See Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed
Encryption Standard, in Building in Big Brother: The Cryptographic Policy Debate 131
(Lance Hoffman ed, 1995).
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Suppose that Louis, an FBI agent, has a Title III" judicial
wiretap authorization5 to monitor Alice's telephone calls. After
recording the call and determining it to be Clipperized, Louis
must obtain a special decrypt processor that has the family key.
Louis can then use the processor to recover Alice's Clipper chip's
serial number and the encrypted session key. Armed with the
serial number and the appropriate legal authorization,56 Louis
can request that the two escrow agents give him the halves of
Alice's chip-unique key; by putting these keys together, Louis is
finally able to decrypt the session key and then decrypt the con-
versation.
Four aspects of this escrow procedure are particularly nota-
ble. First, both escrow agents must cooperate in order for Louis
to be able to decrypt Alice's telephone call with Bob. So far as we
know,57 possession of the family key and half of the chip-unique
key is of no value in decrypting Alice's message. Second, once
Louis has Alice's chip-unique key, he can use it to decrypt all of
Alice's subsequent Clipperized telephone calls, overhearing both
parties,59 regardless of who Alice is talking to or which party
initiated the conversation. Third, although the security of Alice's
Clipperized telephone calls is permanently6" compromised, Bob's
Pub L No 90-351, tit III § 802, 82 Stat 197, 211-25, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN
237, 253 (current version at 18 USC §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp V 1993)) ("Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986") (hereinafter "Title III").
18 USC § 2516 (1988 & Supp V 1993).
Technically, Louis needs only to aver the existence of this authorization since the
escrow agents have no obligation to make an independent confirmation of Louis's authori-
ty. They do, however, have an obligation to keep a record of who asks for what. See State
Authorization Procedures at 1 (cited in note 44); Title III Authorization Procedures at 1
(cited in note 44); FISA Authorization Procedures at 1 (cited in note 44). The Department
of Justice is required to ascertain, after the fact, that the legal authorization existed for
Title III wiretaps and FISA wiretaps. See Title III Authorization Procedures at 2 (stating
that the "Department of Justice shall" ascertain the existence of authorizations for elec-
tronic surveillance); FISA Authorization Procedures at 2 (same). The Justice Department
has no such obligation when the key segment is requested by a state or local police force.
See State Authorization Procedures at 2 (stating that the "Department of Justice may"
inquire into the authorization for electronic surveillance).
'7 Since the SKIPJACK algorithm is classified, one cannot be more certain.
A half key is not useful information because the two halves are XORed together to
produce the actual key. See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 759 (cited'in note 7).
Clipper does not work for conference calls.
The specifications for the decrypt processor call for it to delete keys when a war-
rant expires and to automatically send a confirmation message to the key escrow agents.
The interim model in use by law enforcement organizations in 1994-95 relied on manual
deletion. See Office of Technology Assessment, Information Security at 65 n 5 (Box 2-7)
(cited in note 23) (citing presentation by NIST Security Technology Manager Miles Smid
in June 1994); that is to say, the model relied on trust.
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communication security is unaffected, except when he talks to
Alice, because Louis does not at any time have access to Bob's
chip-unique key. Fourth, the federal escrow agents respond only
to requests from authorized state or federal law enforcement or
intelligence agencies. Even Alice herself cannot get access to her
key if she needs it for some reason.6
B. Key "Escrow" in the Fortezza Card and the "Pile of Keys"
Problem
The mechanics of key escrow in Fortezza have received con-
siderably less attention than have the mechanics of Clipper. This
is a pity because while Clipper has been reduced to a curiosity, 2
the Capstone-based Fortezza card has been adopted as the stan-
dard of the Defense Messaging System, giving it a projected in-
stalled base of two million users.63 Capstone-based PCMCIA
cards are in production and available for purchase by U.S. resi-
dents.
Fortezza and Clipper are similar in that both have a device-
unique key that is used to generate a LEAF containing an en-
crypted version of the session key. This chip-unique key can be
recovered from escrow by authorized government agents. But
Fortezza has significant differences from Clipper because the
Capstone Chip is designed to do different things from Clipper.
While Clipper is exclusively for real-time encryption in tele-
phones, a Fortezza PCMCIA card inserted into a computer can
generate pseudo-random numbers, encrypt e-mail, and produce
digital signatures." In addition to the symmetric chip-unique
6 Given that the Clipper chip is used only for communications, and not to archive
stored information, this is not likely to be a serious problem for Alice; the application of
the same rule is potentially significant for Fortezza escrow.
' See, for example, Jared Sandberg and Don Clark, AT&T, VLSI Technology to
Develop Microchips that Offer Data Security, Wall Street Journal A3 (Jan 31, 1995)
(noting AT&T abandoning Clipper chip).
' To date the NSA has issued solicitations for more than 750,000 Fortezza cards. Up
to two million are expected to be in use by 2005. National Research Council, Kenneth
Dam and Herb Lin, eds, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society 177
(National Academy Press, 1996) (cited in note 1) ("CRISIS Report").
Public-key cryptographic systems allow users to append a digital signature to an
unencrypted message. A digital signature encrypted with a private key uniquely identifies
the sender and connects the sender to the exact message. Anyone who has the user's
public key can then verify the integrity of the signature. Because the signature uses the
plaintext as an input to the encryption algorithm, if the message is altered in even the
slightest way, the signature will not decrypt properly, showing that the message was
altered in transit or that the signature was forged by copying it from a different message.
A digital signature copied from one message has an infinitesimal chance of successfully
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key used by SKIPJACK to generate the LEAF, Fortezza also has
other public/private keys that can be used for e-mail or for trans-
mitting, a SKIPJACK key to a correspondent. These pub-
lic/private keypairs are not escrowed with the government but
may be escrowed with a private company.65
The similarities between Fortezza and Clipper mask a sub-
stantial difference. If Louis, an FBI agent, has a Title III judicial
wiretap authorization to monitor Alice's e-mail, he goes through
steps identical to a Clipper request66 to get access to Alice's outgo-
ing e-mail. This procedure is of no value, however, if Louis wants
access to Alice's incoming e-mail as well. The reason for this is a
little complex, but it is important. When two Clipper chips want
to communicate in real time, they agree on a session key, 7
which they both use for that telephone call. The LEAF-generation
scheme used in Clipper relies on both chips knowing the session
key, and on having both chips exchanging different LEAFs, each
containing the session key. Thus, if Louis has a warrant allowing
him to hear Alice's phone calls, Louis can recover the session key
from either LEAF. Because the two Clipper chips work in synch,
Alice's chip-unique key suffices to hear both sides of the conver-
sation. E-mail doesn't work like that. When Bob sends an e-mail
to Alice, his Capstone chip is not in direct communication with
Alice, and his chip must therefore select the encryption key on its
own.68 As a result, although Bob's chip may send out a valid
LEAF, it is not synchronized with Alice's chip, and Louis cannot
be certain of making Alice's chip emit a LEAF containing the
session key when she reads Bob's e-mail. It follows that unless
Louis can somehow get access to Alice's private key the only way
that he can read Bob's message is to also get the escrow agents
to give him Bob's chip-unique key. If Alice gets lots of e-mail,
authenticating any other message. See Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography 35 (John
Wiley & Sons, 2d ed 1996) (cited in note 16) (noting that a digital signature using a 160-
bit checksum has only a one in 2"6 chance of misidentification).
For a discussion of digital signatures and their importance to electronic commerce
and electronic authentication, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Importance of Trusted Third
Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 Ore L Rev 49 (1996).
See Denning & Branstad, 39 Comm ACM at 36 (cited in note 48).
See note 52 and accompanying text.
See id.
If SKIPJACK is used to encrypt the e-mail, Bob needs a way to give the session
key for that symmetric key system to Alice. He would probably use a public-private key
system, in which he encrypted the session key with Alice's public key. When Alice receives
the message, she will use her private key-which is not escrowed with the govern-
ment-to decrypt the session key that SKIPJACK will accept as input to the decrypt func-
tion.
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Louis may end up compromising a large number of Capstone
chips' security, leading to the "pile of keys" problem.69
In summary, as in the Clipper chip case, both escrow agents
must cooperate in order for Louis to be able to decrypt Alice's
Capstone-encrypted e-mail. Also like Clipper, the federal escrow
agents respond only to requests from authorized state or federal
law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Unlike Clipper, Louis's
possession of Alice's chip-unique key allows Louis to decrypt
Alice's outgoing mail only, although it also gives Louis the ability
to decrypt any messages Alice may have sent before the effective
date of the intercept authorization if Louis can find copies of
them. Unlike Clipper, in which both sides of the conversation
could be heard, none of Alice's incoming mail is automatically
affected. Unless Louis can get Alice's private key, which is not
escrowed in the Fortezza scheme, the only way Louis can read
Bob's encrypted e-mail to Alice is to get the escrow agents to give
him Bob's chip-unique key. As a result, if Bob sends just one e-
mail to Alice while she is the target of an investigation, Louis
may be able to acquire his chip-unique key if the legal system
allows him to get it from the escrow agents, which then gives
Louis access to all of Bob's e-mail.70 As with Clipper, Alice her-
self cannot get access to her key if she loses or damages her
Fortezza card. Since e-mail is sometimes stored for long periods
of time, this could be a more serious problem for Alice than was
the exclusion of user access in Clipper.
C. Bureaucratic Innovation in the Clipper Plan
The Clipper chip affair produced a number of significant
bureaucratic innovations. Each of these innovations appears to
have derived from a common source: the absence of Congressio-
nal authorization for Clipper combined with a reluctance on the
part of the executive branch to involve Congress in the crypto-
graphic policy-making process.
Whether the security of an encryption chip is actually compromised by the release
of the chip-unique key to authorized law enforcement is a subject that polarizes debates
between security professionals and law enforcement. Security professionals presume that
security is unacceptably lessened whenever it is theoretically possible for third parties to
gain access to keys; law enforcement officials tend to presume that the public should trust
them.
70 Using this access for anything other than mail to Alice without judicial authoriza-
tion (or, perhaps, other authorization in the case of national security cases) would violate
Title III.
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Wielding market power to make policy. A stroke of bureau-
cratic genius lay at the heart of the Clipper strategy. Congress
had not, and to this date has not, given the executive branch the
power to control the private use of encryption. Congress has not
even given the executive the power to set up an escrow system
for keys. In the absence of any formal authority to prevent the
adoption of unescrowed cryptography, Clipper's proponents hit
upon the idea of using the government's power as a major con-
sumer of cryptographic products to rig the market. If the govern-
ment could not prevent the public from using nonconforming
products, perhaps it could set the standard by purchasing and
deploying large numbers of escrowed products. People who want-
ed to interoperate with the government's machines would natu-
rally buy the same equipment. The existence of a large function-
ing user base would create further incentives for others to buy
the same equipment, as would the existence of the federal
government's imprimatur in a Federal Information Processing
Standard ("FIPS").7' Furthermore, bulk purchases by the gov-
ernment might drive down unit costs to the point that
nonescrowed products might find it hard to compete.
Strange FIPS. Clipper was announced by means of a Federal
Information Processing Standard, FIPS 185. FIPSs are standards
and guidelines that are ordinarily intended to improve the feder-
al government's use and management of computers and informa-
tion technology, and to standardize procurement of those
goods.72 Formally, FIPSs apply only to the federal government
and some contractors. A FIPS normally describes the device it
covers in sufficient detail for the informed reader to distinguish a
conforming device from a nonconforming device; indeed, FIPSs
exist to provide that guidance. FIPS 185 was unusual in that
rather than describing the essential, classified parts of the
SKIPJACK encryption system or the LEAF creation method,
FIPS 185 stated that conforming devices would be certified by
the NSA.
73
APA avoidance. Notice of a proposed FIPS is usually pub-
lished in the Federal Register, with a request for public com-
ments. The final version is also published in the Federal Reg-
"' Mitch Ratcliffe, Security Chips Trigger Alarm: Clipper and Capstone Open Digital
Back Door, MacWeek 1 (Apr 26, 1993) (stating that FIPS often become de facto standards
because the U.S. government is the largest computer customer in the world).
12 See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 764-67 (cited in note 7).
"' FIPS 185 at 6005 (cited in note 36).
IT CAME FROM PLANET CLIPPER
ister. FIPS 185 was no exception. Notice and publication are not,
however, required by statute.74 The government argues that a
FIPS is not within the class of rules to which the notice and
comment procedure of section 553 of the APA 75 applies, and that
was particularly true of FIPS 185 since it was, by its own terms,
completely voluntary, even for federal agencies.76 The formally
voluntary nature of the standard was also used to justify the
government's decision to refuse to address the concerns of com-
mentators who understood that FIPS 185 was an attempt to
coerce the public through market means.
It was a clever strategy. Nevertheless, the Clipper plan was
unpopular from its inception and soon withered in the face of
public opposition. Capstone on the other hand has had at least
some success, albeit not enough to achieve the FBI's goal of en-
suring that cryptography imposes no obstacle to law
enforcement's legal efforts to acquire the content of electronic
communications and stored data.
II. SOFTWARE KEY ESCROW
Even as Clipper was being unveiled in 1994, Vice President
Gore suggested that the proposal might be modified to allow the
export of cryptosystems in which keys were deposited with certi-
fied private escrow agents rather than directly with the govern-
ment.77 As it became increasingly clear that the Clipper plan
would fail, the administration began to consult industry and
other groups about a new proposal linking limited relaxation of
export control with modified key escrow. The government called
this revised plan "software key escrow,"78 or sometimes "commer-
74 See 40 USC § 759(d)(1) (1988) (requiring publication in the Federal Register only if
President disapproves or modifies a FIPS).
7' 5 USC § 553(b)-(d) (1988). NIST has traditionally followed a notice and comment
procedure for FIPSs while maintaining that no statute actually requires it. But see
American College of Neuropsychopharmacology v Weinberger, Food Drug Cosm L Rep
(CCH) § 38,025 (D DC July 31, 1975) (holding that publication in the Federal Register
combined with the complexity of the rules themselves meant that the rules in question
were subject to the notice and comment procedures of section 553 of the APA).
"' FIPS 185 at 5998 (cited in note 36).
77 See Letter from Vice President Al Gore to Congresswoman Maria Cantwell (July
20, 1994) (available online at ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/
gore_clipperretreatcantwell072094.letter). But see Statement of Patrick Leahy on Vice
President Gore's Clipper chip Letter (July 21, 1994) (available online at ftp.//ftp.eff.org/
pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/goresclipperretreatleahy. statement) (stating that the
Gore letter "represents no change in policy").
78 See Draft Software Key Escrow Encryption Export Criteria, httpJ/csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/
keyescrow/criteria.txt; Key Escrow Agent Criteria, http'/csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/agent-
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cial key escrow" ("CKE"),79 but opponents dubbed it "Son of Clip-
per" or "Clipper II." Unlike Clipper, which relied on SKIPJACK,
the software key escrow plan did not specify any particular en-
cryption algorithm. Instead, the plan contained performance
criteria designed to limit applications to at best medium-quality
ciphers and to ensure that keys would be accessible when the
government presented a lawful request. By mid-1996, however,
several technical and political developments cast serious doubt on
the viability of the proposal.
The software key escrow proposal combined the functions of
key archiving, in which the owner of a key has emergency access
to a backup copy of a lost key, with key "escrow," in which the
government ensures that someone other than the keyholder has a
copy of the key. If Bob has a copy of Alice's key, the government
can serve a subpoena on Bob without tipping off Alice that she is
the target of an investigation. Ensuring that the key is available
from Bob means that the government has a way to decrypt
Alice's' data that is much easier than subjecting it to a "brute-
force" decryption. °
One might ask why a foreign customer would be interested
in a cryptographic product designed to be vulnerable to eaves-
dropping by the U.S. government. The government's proposal
suggested that if suitable agreements could be negotiated with
foreign governments, the escrow agents could be located abroad,
under the control of a foreign government.81 Although the pro-
posal itself was silent on the likely content of foreign rules, it
was possible to imagine circumstances in which a foreign gov-
ernment would favor escrowed encryption products, or even ban
unescrowed encryption, in order to retain its eavesdropping capa-
criteria.txt.
7 See Draft Software Key Escrow Encryption Export Criteria (cited in note 78); Key
Escrow Agent Criteria (cited in note 78). The term "commercial key escrow" was some-
thing of a misnomer, since the proposal was neither commercial nor escrow as the terms
are understood by most lawyers and business people. It was "commercial" only in the
sense that the keyholders might be private firms rather than the government. It was not
.escrow" in any ordinary sense of the word: usually, something held in escrow is held for
the benefit of the owner. In software key escrow, as in Clipper, the "escrow" was for the
benefit of the government rather than the owner of the key.
"Commercial Key EscrowTM" (with capital letters) is a trademark of Trusted Informa-
tion Systems.
8' For a discussion of brute-force decryption, which is little more than trying every
possible key until you find one that works, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the
Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Penn L Rev 709, 887-89
(1995) (cited in note 7).
"' Key Escrow Agent Criteria at T 18 (cited in note 78).
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bilities. Customers in such countries might have no choice but to
buy an escrowed product if they wanted relatively strong, legal
encryption.
In any event, nothing in the proposal would have allowed the
export of products strong enough to defeat brute-force decryption
by a determined government. The proposal contemplated allow-
ing the export of products using ciphers with a key length of
sixty-four bits or less, and only if the product also complied with
other onerous criteria designed to prevent users from tampering
with it to use unapproved algorithms. Each of these policies im-
posed significant burdens on the potential marketability of any
product in addition to the fundamental problem that users would
know they were buying a product designed to allow government
access to their secrets. In particular, software makers desiring
export clearance for products using encryption between forty and
sixty-four bits would be required to:
(1) Refuse to publish their source code. This requirement is a
significant obstacle to the sale of a security product because it
means that outside experts are unable to verify the implementa-
tion of the algorithm. The proposal would have allowed firms to
publish their algorithm and to publish input-output tables allow-
ing users to check that the product really used the advertised
algorithm, but these concessions were far from sufficient. There
is much more to evaluating the security of an encryption system
than merely proving that it uses DES instead of a simple letter
substitution routine. For example, Netscape browsers were re-
cently found to have a bug in their random number generators
that resulted in predictable patterns in the numbers used to
encrypt communications." No test using an input-output table
could detect this kind of error, but it is no less fatal.
(2) Build in tamper-resistance. The software would have to be
designed to fail to run if users changed it in any way. This might
have made upgrades more difficult.
(3) Design a means "of preventing multiple encryption. The
rationale for this requirement was to prevent a DES system from
being used to produce 3-DES. In 3-DES a message is encrypted
with DES using one key, decrypted with DES using a different
82 See John Markoff, Security Flaw is Discovered in Software Used in Shopping, NY
Times Al (Sept 19, 1995); Netscape, Welcome to Netscape Navigator Version 2.01, avail-
able online at http://partner.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.01/relnotes/unix-
2.01.html#Security (describing problem with implementation of random number generator
and announcing bugfix).
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key, and then re-encrypted using either the original key or a
third key. 3-DES is considered much stronger than ordinary DES
and is gradually replacing DES as a de facto international stan-
dard for high security civilian encryption. 3
(4) Ensure that the product refuses to communicate with
unescrowed systems. This feature alone would probably be enough
to make the product uncompetitive unless unescrowed systems
were very rare or unreliable.
Despite these enormous obstacles to commercial viability, the
software key escrow plan was founded on the accurate observa-
tion that if businesses began to encrypt their data with strong
ciphers, they would need some means to access that data in
emergencies. Security professionals call this "key management,"
but they mean something that is not identical to key escrow.
Wise key management involves ensuring access to copies of keys
used in the course of business."' For a corporation encrypting its
information, fail-safe access to critical data is essential. However,
not all keys are equal. Access to the keys that safeguard corpo-
rate records might be more important than access to an
employee's e-mail, although one could imagine circumstances,
such as litigation, in which access to e-mail was necessary to
reconstruct a transaction. Keys encrypting telephone conversa-
tions might be less important still, although even they might be
useful if the firm imagines that it, or the police, might need to
eavesdrop on employees in the course of an investigation of fraud
or theft.
The software key escrow proposal extended to all keys used
in communications, including telephones, but it did not involve
the "escrow" of keys used in digital signatures. Indeed, escrow of
digital-signature keys would be a very bad idea. For one thing,
businesses would have little need to ensure emergency access to
keys that give employees the power to do something because a
well-designed key management system allows the appropriate
authorities to revoke. and create individuals' authorizations at
will. For example, a corporation might issue digitally signed
See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 740-41 (cited in note 7).
Since the person holding the keys can gut the security of the system if she does not
hold the keys in a secure fashion, reasonable security may require that key fragments be
distributed to two or more parties. In some systems the backup keyholders are not given
the actual key to the cipher, but are instead entrusted with the key to a generic "data re-
covery field" encrypted into each message that contains the information needed to retrieve
the key. The Clipper chip's LEAF, see note 52 and accompanying text, is an example of
such a field.
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certificates authorizing the holder of a digital-signature key to
sign things in the corporate name or to transact up to a defined
dollar limit.85 Each digital-signature key is unique, and identi-
fies the persons involved in the transaction just as much as it au-
thenticates them as legitimate corporate representatives. A sup-
plier presented with an employee's digital signature would ordi-
narily check to ensure that the certificate backing up that signa-
ture was valid before relying on it. This authentication usually
requires a real-time check on the continuing validity of the corpo-
rate certificate.86 If the employee's authorization lapsed for any
reason, the corporation could easily revoke the certificate, mak-
ing continuing authentication of the employee's digital signature
impossible. As a result, a business using certificated digital sig-
natures in its transactions would never need to forge an
employee's digital signature, and would not want to create this
capability for anyone else. The company retains control over dele-
gated powers without needing to be able to pretend to be the
employee.
Worse, "escrow" of a digital-signature key would tend to
undermine one of the most important and useful features of a
digital-signature system. So long as the user keeps control of her
key, a message digitally signed by the user's key demonstrates
beyond almost any doubt that the message was actually sent by
that person and that it has not been altered in any way since it
was signed. Admitting any challenge to the uniqueness of the
signature would introduce a destructive element of doubt to this
assurance, and would elevate the claim that a digital signature
had been forged from the incredible to the conceivable. To its
credit, the Administration recognized this and sought to exclude
digital-signature keys from its key escrow proposal.87
Overall, the software key escrow plan sought to expand
users' evident need for some sort of key archive in two directions
that were less obviously in tune with users' interests. First the
plan would have applied to encrypted communications, such as
telephone conversations, as well as to stored data, although it
was far from obvious that many would have chosen to archive
keys used for communication rather than storage. Some compa-
' For a definition of a digital signatures, see note 64 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of a digital-signature infrastructure and the role of certificates, see generally A.
Michael Froomkin, The Importance of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75
Or L Rev 49 (1996) (cited in note 64).
See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 82 (cited in note 64).
87 But see note 168 and accompanying text.
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nies might reasonably feel that they benefit from having the
ability to eavesdrop on their employees. Some companies might
reasonably conclude that they are better off if the government
can easily investigate employees suspected of misdeeds. For these
corporations, fraud prevention might be more important than em-
ployee and corporate privacy. Other companies might feel differ-
ently. Whatever the corporate view, individuals derive no direct
personal benefit from making it possible for the government to
tap their telephones, although society as a whole might gain
some benefit from the increased effectiveness of law enforcement.
A. Who Holds the Keys
Because the person holding the "escrowed" key is capable of
undermining the very security that a cryptographic security sys-
tem is designed to create, the identity and duties of that
keyholder are of paramount importance to anyone whose key is
being held in this manner.
As originally formulated, the software key escrow plan ap-
peared to assume that keys would be "escrowed" with an outside
party."8 Because one of the public objections to the Clipper pro-
posal had been that the government would hold the keys, soft-
ware key escrow contemplated that someone other than the gov-
ernment-a private escrow agent or the designer of the soft-
ware-would be allowed to select a private "escrow agent." The
plan was silent on critical questions, however, including:
" what security precautions commercial archives or commer-
cial escrow agents would be required to offer;
" the liability of "escrow agents" in the event of
-the loss of a key;
-the compromise of a key, such as where the escrow
agent's database is hacked or an employee is
discovered to have sold key data;
-the good faith compliance with a facially valid but actu-
ally invalid warrant;
" under what circumstances a user could serve as his own
escrow agent.
The liability issues were particularly difficult to deduce from the
software key escrow proposal because it was unclear to what
extent a user's participation in key escrow was truly voluntary.
' Key Escrow Issues Meeting, September 6-7, 1995, Discussion Paper #4 § 10, http'/
csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/september issuesmtg/paper4.html.
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The more that the participation appeared coerced, the further the
user-"escrow agent" relationship moved away from simple con-
tract towards state action, and the murkier the liability questions
became.
Indeed, the earlier Clipper proposal was notoriously silent on
the duties and liabilities of the government escrow agents, lead-
ing all too easily to the conclusion that they would be difficult if
not impossible to sue in the case of key compromise, and might
effectively be accountable to no one. The Attorney General's es-
crow procedures for Clipper and Capstone state that they "do not
create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for
individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance."89 In
effect, the government disclaimed any reliance interest that a
user of a Clipper telephone might have in the government's
promise to keep the key secret. 0 A victim of an illegal wiretap
would have a cause of action under Title III against the wiretap-
per," but, it seemed, no remedy against the escrow agents, even
if the escrow agents acted negligently or failed to follow their
own procedures. If nothing else, this precedent suggested that
liability rules should be of concern to potential users of key es-
crow.
Some of the concern over liability might have been alleviated
by having private escrow agents take on contractual responsibili-
ties; other answers might have resided in tort law, and still oth-
ers might have emerged if the courts had considered the escrow
agent to be a bailee or a trustee for the key's owner. In the ab-
sence of many functioning escrow agents, and in the complete
absence of case law, there was at least considerable uncertainty
as to what law governed an escrow agent. Worse, from the point
of view of a business contemplating the use of an escrowed prod-
uct, there was no reason to believe that an escrow agent would
have sufficient assets to compensate the victim of unauthorized
key disclosure for the potentially enormous damage that could be
caused by the release of jealously guarded trade secrets and oth-
er corporate data.
Some businesses, especially smaller ones without their own
security professionals, would likely have felt that they had less
risk of unauthorized disclosure if they entrusted their backup
9 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Key Escrow Encryption: Announce-
ments-February 4, 1994 (Feb 25, 1994) (cited in note 44) (on file with the Legal Forum).
See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 762 (cited in note 7).
See 18 USC § 2520(a) (1994).
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keys to outside professionals. Other firms, especially large multi-
nationals with their own security staffs, might have made a dif-
ferent calculation and preferred to hold their own keys; they
made this clear to the government when it published its first
software key escrow proposal and asked for comments.
The government's response to these comments, unveiled in
December 1995, was to clarify its objectives regarding the selec-
tion and certification of escrow agents. While agreeing that it
would be "beneficial" to criminalize the "abuse of the escrowed
key by the escrow agents or others,"92 the proposal concentrated
on the primary government objective of "assuring the availability
of escrowed keys for properly authorized government officials" in
a reliable and timely manner that would not tip off the subject of
the investigation." Recognizing that some organizations or peo-
ple would want to be their own escrow agents, the proposal re-
quired that agents undertake to hold keys securely, and set out
general requirements for the secure storage and transmittal of
keys. More controversially, the proposal required that each es-
crow agent:
" employ one or more persons with a "SECRET" clearance;94
" provide a Dun & Bradstreet/TRW number or equivalent
credit report pointer and authorization;95
" carry an errors & omissions insurance policy;9
" be primarily owned by U.S. citizens if located in the U.S.97
The draft candidly admitted that "[w]e have not yet addressed
conditions under which users can be the sole repository of the
keys for their system,"98 although government speakers at the
December NIST meeting indicated that they intended to allow
suitable organizations able to comply with all the escrow-agent
criteria to hold their own keys. In addition, although the govern-
ment held out the possibility of foreign escrow agents, at least for
foreign users, this possibility was contingent on negotiating ap-
propriate agreements with each foreign government involved.
92 Key Escrow Agent Criteria (cited in note 78). Irritatingly, all the government
memoranda distributed at the 1995 NIST meetings on key escrow were handed out





Key Escrow Agent Criteria 9 14 (cited in note 78).
97 Id 1 18.
98 Id.
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The requirement that escrow agents employ someone with a
SECRET clearance-which had not been stated in the original
software key escrow proposal--quickly engendered the greatest
controversy, although taken as a group the other requirements
were sufficiently burdensome to make it unlikely that any but a
good-sized corporation could be its own escrow agent. Critics
attacked the SECRET clearance requirement as a device the
government could use to manipulate who it would allow to be an
escrow agent. Others worried that the requirement could become
a means by which the government could control agents' behavior,
since agents could be threatened with a loss of their clearance if
they did not do what the government wanted.
From the government's viewpoint, however, the SECRET
clearance requirement was a necessary element of the key escrow
strategy once it became clear that some escrow agents would be
outside the government. Under federal regulations, wiretap and
other orders issued by the FISA court are classified.99 Thus, for
example, federal law requires that telephone companies have
someone on their staff with a SECRET clearance to receive and
comply with FISA court-ordered wiretaps.00
B. Un-Commercial Key Escrow?
By late 1995, the software key escrow proposal had evolved
to differ from Clipper in three important respects. First, the plan
would allow the export of strong software encryption products,
which made it broader and more acceptable to industry than the
original Clipper proposal, which had been limited to hardware.
Second, rather than allowing the export of the classified
SKIPJACK algorithm provided for Clipper, which had an eighty-
bit key, software key escrow products would be limited to sixty-
four bit products.'0 ' The choice of algorithm was welcome, but
the sixty-four-bit limitation made the proposal considerably less
popular than it might otherwise have been. Third, the govern-
ment would no longer demand that it hold the keys itself; in-
stead, it offered to certify others to serve as private escrow
agents in its stead. As we have seen, however, this offer soon
proved to be less open-ended than it first appeared.
99 See 50 USC § 1802(a)(4)(B) (1994) (authorizing Attorney General to classify fact of
FISA order and to require that common carrier served with FISA order keep it secret).
10 See id.
1o Draft Software Key Escrow Encryption Export Criteria 91 7 (cited in note 78).
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As with Clipper, the carrot held out to the software industry,
and to users, was that the government might relax export con-
trols. This was a powerful inducement since the ITAR regime
imposed a de facto ban on the rapid export of encryption with
more than forty-bit keys, and an all but impermeable ban on the
export of ciphers stronger than fifty-six-bit DES. The stick was
that the government demanded a computationally trivial, if not
necessarily legally or procedurally trivial, means of gaining ac-
cess to information encrypted by an exportable cipher by requir-
ing that decryption keys, or the key fragments needed to recon-
struct a key, be deposited with approved escrow agents.
Viewed from a charitable perspective, the software key es-
crow proposals floated in 1995 were simply cautious. Key escrow
would guarantee the government access to encrypted information
when it had a lawful order authorizing that access. As the gov-
ernment could get a copy of any escrowed key, it should have
been indifferent to the key length. Despite the elaborate system
designed to provide the government with the key, it continued to
limit exportable cryptosystems to sixty-four bits. When asked
why, government representatives would say only that they want-
ed to proceed with care, since they were not certain that parts of
their proposed system, notably the attempt to design tamperproof
software, would necessarily work in practice.
Viewed from a less charitable perspective, the conditions in
the software key escrow proposal were onerous and uncommer-
cial. The idea of escrow itself was loathed in some quarters. The
sixty-four-bit limit was felt to be restrictive, especially when
compared to 3-DES10 2 and to IDEA, an increasingly popular
128-bit Swiss cipher. The requirement that escrow agents have a
SECRET clearance was not perhaps as restrictive as it appeared,
since these clearances are relatively easy to obtain, but the re-
quirement tended to solidify the opposition of those suspicious of
the escrow concept to begin with. Most, albeit not all, of the
attendees at the NIST meeting in December 1995 who represent-
ed businesses wishing to export security products stated that
they did not think the rules would allow them to export a com-
mercially viable product. 13
"o See note 83 and accompanying text.
1o3 A similar sentiment was voiced outside the meeting. See, for example, John
Markoff, Industry Group Rebuffs U.S. On Encryption, NY Times D5 (Nov 8, 1995).
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III. THE UNDEATH OF KEY ESCROW
Undaunted by the failure of Clipper and the rocky reception
accorded software key escrow, the U.S. government returned to
its strategy of looking for a lever with which to encourage or
force the use of escrowed encryption. Using government market
power to set a Clipper standard had failed. Using the carrot of
relaxed export control to get software escrow did not seem to be
taking the market by storm. Formally, both strategies remain in
place, but neither seems likely to resolve the encryption dilemma.
The new strategies for key escrow are, if anything, more subtle.
On the one hand, the U.S. government now proposes to build
escrow into the sinews of emerging networks of electronic com-
merce; on the other hand, the U.S. government is actively en-
gaged with-or, some say, leading-foreign governments to set
up international agreements that promote or require escrow as a
condition of allowing transnational use of strong cryptography.
The distinction between encouraging escrow and forcing escrow is
significant, but the current policy is both evolving and opaque,
making it unclear whether encouraging or forcing is the better
word to describe the Administration's policy.
A. Evolution of the Key Escrow Debate
Four of the arguments frequently used by supporters of cryp-
tographic export control were weakened, perhaps refuted, in the
debates sparked by Clipper and software key escrow. The argu-
ment that existing rules allow the export of adequately strong
cryptography was undermined by a report by a group of respect-
ed cryptographers. The argument that cryptographic export con-
trol imposes at most a minor burden on U.S. industry was chal-
lenged by a Department of Commerce study. The same study
undermined the validity of the assumption that there are no
serious foreign competitors for U.S. cryptographic products, as
did the announcement of several new foreign sources of brand-
name cryptography. Perhaps most importantly, the argument
that there are good reasons, known only to those with access to
highly classified information, why cryptography needs to be con-
trolled, was decisively repudiated by the National Research
Council's cryptography study.
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1. Key length.
As computers become more powerful, longer and longer keys
are needed to provide a consistent level of protection against
brute-force attacks. This fact, more than any other, has created
pressure to relax the ITAR. A recent report signed by seven lead-
ing cryptographers,'" Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ci-
phers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security, estimated that
the forty-bit keys allowed by the ITAR "offer virtually no protec-
tion" today, that fifty-six-bit DES "is increasingly inadequate,"
and that "adequate protection" against "serious threats" requires
at least seventy-five-bit keys." 5 The cryptographers calculated
that a standard $10,000 computer could break forty-bit keys in
an average of twelve minutes; a standard $10 million machine
could do it in an average of less than a second; and optimized
single-purpose machines could do the same job even faster and
cheaper. 106
Whether or not the Minimal Key Lengths conclusions are
exactly right,0 7 they are likely to be widely believed. As a re-
sult, the Minimal Key Lengths study is likely to shape the per-
ceived security needs of commercial buyers of security products.
These users will not be satisfied with fifty-six-bit DES for long, if
104 The cryptographers were Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Ronald L. Rivest, Bruce
Schneier, Tsutomu Shimomura, Eric Thompson, and Michael Wiener. See note 105.
" Matt Blaze, et al, Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate
Commercial Security, http'/www.bsa.org/bsa/cryptologists.html (Jan 1996).
l Id T 3.
107 One might quibble with these conclusions on two levels. Some argue that they are
"threat estimates" rather than descriptions of actual capabilities today. Despite relatively
conservative estimates of the capabilities of various existing hardware devices, the paper
made little allowance for some practical difficulties with running a brute-force cracking
device. In particular, the cryptographers' estimates begin with the standard assumption of
a "known plaintext." This often, but not inevitably, accurate assumption is that at least
part of the plaintext message sought to be decrypted is known to the attacker, perhaps
because the message follows a standard form (such as a TO and FROM line in a memo).
An attacker who lacks a known plaintext must devote extra computing time to deciding
whether the text of each possible decryption of the message has an alphanumeric distribu-
tion consistent with ordinary language. This does not make brute-force decryption impos-
sible, but it does slow it down.
Perhaps more telling, there is no public evidence that either businesses or law en-
forcement agencies have actually constructed a sophisticated brute force-decryption
engine, much less employed it routinely. If they had, one might expect the information to
leak eventually. Compare US Cryptography Policy: Why We Are Taking the Current
Approach, http'//csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/policy.txt (July 12, 1996) (suggesting that
.operational reality" of government ability to decrypt messages greatly lags behind
"mathematical theory").
Of course, anyone purchasing a security system today needs to build in sufficient se-
curity not just for the life of the system but, ideally, for the life of the data likely to be
encrypted with that system. This requires a considerable margin for safety.
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at all, and are likely to demand key lengths in the seventy-five-
bit range suggested by the report in the near future. As a result,
the government's willingness to relax the forty-bit limit to sixty-
four-bits-plus-escrow in the software key escrow plan is likely to
appear quite ungenerous.
2. Effect on commerce.
Encryption is becoming big business, with worldwide sales of
encryption products estimated at $1.8 billion for this year. U.S.
sales alone are estimated at just under $1 billion. Since a good
fraction of this number is sales of hardware products, the soft-
ware component represents only a small, but rapidly growing,
part of the $77 billion world market for packaged software prod-
ucts."8
The Commerce/NSA study confirmed that foreign suppliers of
encryption products are selling products advertised to use stron-
ger algorithms, e.g. DES, than can be freely exported from the
U.S."° Although the details were not released in the unclassi-
fied version of the report, the study suggested that these foreign
implementations of DES were "not as secure as some U.S. prod-
ucts." Even so, the report stated, their existence "can have an
effect on U.S. industry's competitiveness.... Some foreign en-
cryption vendors reportedly use the existence of U.S. export con-
trols on strong encryption to differentiate their products and
capture markets from U.S. firms."1 '
While the foreign demand for encryption is still small, it is
growing. The Commerce/NSA study demonstrated that U.S. firms
were badly positioned to exploit this market despite dominance
in the software industry, in large part because of export control
or their self-censoring reaction to the controls. The conclusion
that U.S. export controls can give foreign firms a competitive
advantage was hardly surprising, but it added weight to the
political case for relaxation of export control being mounted by
the software industry.
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Security Agency, A Study of the
International Market for Computer Software with Encryption III-1, 111-6 (1996) (cited in
note 9) ("Export Study").
O9 Id at IV-1.
"o Id at IV-3 to IV-4.
46 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
3. Foreign sources of encryption technology.
As we have seen, the de facto dominance of the U.S. comput-
er industry has served as a critical component of the twin export-
control and escrow advocacy policies of the U.S. government.
Although foreign cryptographic products exist, none has been
incorporated into a U.S.-made mass-market product. Further-
more, some of the best-known cryptographic products, such as
the RSA encryption algorithm,"' are themselves produced in
the U.S. The absence of familiar brand names abroad has no
doubt contributed to the slow spread of strong cryptography.
The cozy assumption that marketable cryptography does not
breed outside the U.S. is suddenly less credible than it appeared
to be even a year ago. First, reputable non-U.S. manufacturers
such as Nippon Telephone and Telegraph have announced that
they intend to produce strong cryptographic devices." 2 Second,
U.S.-based companies have announced that they plan to import
foreign cryptosystems and sell them under their own label.13
Once in the U.S., strong foreign cryptography is no more export-
able than the homegrown variety, but some U.S. companies ap-
parently believe that they can structure their production so that
non-U.S. clients would be served from offshore production sites
and the goods would never fall within U.S. jurisdiction. Third,
U.S. companies such as RSA are forming alliances with foreign
cryptographers in which the U.S. tradename will be licensed to
the foreign supplier."' The foreign product can be either indige-
nous or an indigenous implementation of an algorithm published
in the U.S. since, at least at the moment, it is not an export-con-
trol violation to send encryption algorithms abroad in the form of
equations printed on paper."'
m See generally RSA's Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography,
http://www.rsa.com/yrsalabs/faq/faq rsa.html (1993).
'12 See Testimony of RSA Data Security, Inc. President Jim Bidzos before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Space &
Technology, 1996 WL 10828659 (June 12, 1996) (stating that NT&T is shipping encryp-
tion chips with 1024-bit RSA).
11 For example, Sun Microsystems plans to import a Russian-built system for this
reason. John Battelle, Sun's Codemaking Comrades, Wired 3.11 at 49 (Nov 1995).
11 "RSA, which is based in Redwood City, Calif., plans to fund an effort by Chinese
government scientists to develop new encryption software. The Chinese-developed soft-
ware, based on RSA's general mathematical formula, may be more powerful than versions
now permitted for export under U.S. laws, said James Bidzos, RSA's president." Don
Clark, China, U.S. Firm Challenge U.S. On Encryption-Software Exports, Wall Street
Journal A10 (Feb 8, 1996). For RSA's version of its alliance, see RSA, RSA Data Security,
Inc. and People's Republic of China Sign MOU on Encryption Technology and Joint
Research, http'//www.rsa.com/rsa/china.rsa.htm (Feb 2, 1996).
... The State Department ruled that exports of the dead tree version of the book
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4. The CRISIS Report.
On May 30, 1996, the National Research Council released a
prepublication draft of Cryptography's Role in Securing the Infor-
mation Society ("CRISIS Report"), emphasizing the cost to the
United States of not having strong, widely deployed cryptography
in an age of large information-security vulnerabilities that could
affect important civilian applications. The Committee that
authored the Report was drawn from leaders in national security,
law, foreign relations, communications, and computer science.
The Report is unusually thorough, containing a wealth of infor-
mation on cryptography and cryptography policy, and its conclu-
sions are likely to shape the cryptography debate.
Indeed, the Report's most important achievement may be
that its existence legitimates debate. One argument sometimes
heard in defense of key escrow and other controls on crypto-
graphic technology is that "if you knew what we knew, you would
agree with us."116 The CRISIS Report decisively neutralizes
that argument when it states that "the cleared members of the
[National Research Council's Committee to Study National Cryp-
tography Policy] (13 of its 16 members) concluded that the debate
over national cryptography policy can be carried out in a reason-
able manner on an unclassified basis.""7
The Committee's first recommendation is that "no law should
bar the manufacture, sale, or use of any form of encryption with-
Applied Cryptography (1st ed) were not subject to the ITAR. Letter from William B.
Robinson, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls, to Phil Karn, httpJ/
www.qualcomm.com/peoplelpkarnlexport/book-response.html (Mar 2, 1994). However, the
US government's brief in Karn v. United States, 925 F Supp 1 (D DC 1996), appeal
docketed, suggested that this ruling might have been a mistake. Defendants' Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities at § II B2i, available online at httpj/
www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/exporttmemorandum.html (Nov 15, 1995). Judge
Richie's ruling in the Karn case was sufficiently broad as to give comfort to a government
official thinking of toughening the policy.
"' National Research Council, Kenneth Dam & Herb Lin, eds, Cryptography's Role in
Securing the Information Society ("CRISIS Report") xii (National Academy Press, 1996)
(cited in note 1). As the Report notes,
Such a position may be true or false, but it clearly does not provide much reas-
surance for those not privy to those secrets for one very simple reason: those
who fear that government is hiding poorly-conceived policies behind a wall of se-
crecy are not likely to trust the government, yet in the absence of a substantive
argument being called for, the government's claim is essentially a plea for trust.
Id.
17 Id at 4 (emphasis in original).
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in the United States.""' As the committee noted, this recom-
mendation conforms to current Administration policy, although
this is an area where no administration can bind its successors.
On the question of whether the gains to national security
from secure communications and data storage outweigh the loss-
es to law enforcement and national security, the Report concludes
that, "on balance, the advantages of more widespread use of
cryptography outweigh the disadvantages."' The Report does
not, however, recommend that the application of the ITAR to
cryptography be discontinued. Instead, it recommends that export
controls on cryptography "should be progressively relaxed but not
eliminated," 2 with most export control on fifty-six-bit DES be-
ing removed immediately so long as the products cannot be used
to generate 3-DES."2'
The decision to draw the line at DES has all the earmarks of
a political compromise. The report lists six advantages of DES:
" DES offers a higher level of confidentiality than common
forty-bit ciphers, one "adequate to promote broader uses
of cryptography."
* DES is certified as secure by the U.S. government. The
U.S. government's certification is due to expire in
1997,122 and the Report notes that "future certification
cannot be assured."
1 23
" DES has been subjected to public scrutiny for more than
twenty years and no one has found significant
weaknesses in the algorithm.
" DES is in the public domain.
" DES has "nearly universal name recognition."
1 24
" U.S. exporters need DES to be on a level playing field with
foreign suppliers.
Notably absent from this list is any assertion that DES repre-
sents the user's optimal tradeoff between security on the one
hand and financial and computer-processing cost on the other.
Instead, the Committee says DES is "'good enough' for most in-
formation security applications and is likely to be good enough
for the next decade, because only the most highly motivated and
.18 Id at 303.
11 Id at 6.
20 Id at 307.
121 CRISIS Report at 312-13 (cited in note 1). On 3-DES, see note 83.
122 See note 10.
123 CRISIS Report at 315 (cited in note 1).
124 Id.
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well-funded organizations will be capable of sustaining brute-
force attacks on DES during that time."2'
In short, fifty-six-bit DES is a lot better than the forty-bit
ciphers freely exportable today and was, in the Committee's judg-
ment, the most that one could get. The Report forthrightly ad-
mits that "a replacement for DES will eventually be needed," but
balances this with the statement that a move to widespread use
of DES "may have a negative impact on the collection of signals
intelligence"26 albeit one that "has well-known and well-under-
stood characteristics."'27 What this suggests about the U.S.
government's ability to do brute-force decryption of DES messag-
es is left to the reader's imagination.
As for encryption products stronger than DES, the CRISIS
Report says that they should be allowed to approved end-users,
but only when the end-user is willing to "provide access to
decrypted information upon legally authorized request."'28 The
recommendation leaves it open to the end-user to determine how
to do this, although it notes that "many of them may well choose
to use escrowed encryption products."'29
The CRISIS Report also proposes that the U.S. government
explore using escrowed encryption for internal purposes to "better
understand how escrowed encryption might operate,"3 ' and
that the U.S. government should "work with other nations" in
order to "address the critical international dimensions of
escrowed communications." 3' Despite recommending that the
U.S. government work out international escrow agreements and
itself serve as an escrow testbed, the NRC committee concluded
that "aggressive promotion" of escrowed encryption to the private
sector "is not appropriate at this time."'32 It gave four reasons:
First, too little is known about how to implement escrowed en-
cryption to rely on it for a large-scale deployment. Second, be-
cause it is too easy to circumvent escrowed encryption schemes, it
is unclear how valuable it would be. Third, technologies are
changing so rapidly that imposing any system on the market
would greatly distort progress in these areas. Fourth, it is un-
Id at 316.
126 Id at 317.
127 CRISIS Report at 317 (cited in note 1).
128 Id at 317-18.
Id at 318.
'3 Id at 328.
131 CRISIS Report at 328 (cited in note 1).
'32 Id at 329.
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clear whether the market would accept escrow.'33 This conclu-
sion-neither a rejection nor an endorsement of key escrow-has
already proved controversial, as it pleased neither the proponents
of escrow 34 nor its opponents.'35 It, also had no effect on the
Administration, which is forging ahead with its plans for
escrowed systems. 3 '
The CRISIS Report also makes a number of suggestions as
to how the U.S. government could "assist law enforcement and
national security to adjust to new technical realities of the infor-
mation age." In particular it proposes that the U.S. government
encourage the use of cryptography for user authentication, docu-
ment authentication (digital signatures), and secure time
stamps.'37 Each of these suggestions should be uncontroversial.
B. "Clipper III": a Proposal for an (Escrowed) Key-Management
Infrastructure
At the close of the December 1995 Key Escrow Issues Meet-
ing, NIST predicted that it would issue new guidelines setting
out a relaxation in the export rules for software key-escrow prod-
ucts within a few weeks. The guidelines were then to be turned
over to the State Department to implement, either as modifica-
tions to the ITAR regime or in some other manner.
More than six months later, neither a new FIPS nor a final
draft of the interagency guidelines has yet appeared, suggesting
that the interagency group directing export policy-which in-
cludes representatives from the FBI, NSA, NIST, and the Execu-
tive Office of the President-has been unable to agree on a firm
policy. Instead, In May 1996, the Interagency Working Group on
Cryptography Policy issued yet another trial balloon, in the form
of a draft paper, Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Pub-
lic Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure (the "White
Paper").'38 Its critics quickly dubbed it "Clipper III."
"3 Id at 329-33.
See, for example, Dorothy E. Denning, Comments on the NRC Cryptography
Report, http//guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypt/NRC.txt (June 11, 1996).
'3" See, for example, EFF "Privacy-Crypto-Key Escrow & Govt. Access to Keys" Archive,
http//www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Key-escrow/ ("Unfortunately, the report also calls for key
'escrow', and buys into the government's wacky idea of a federally-controlled 'Key
Infrastructure', among other flaws").
'3' See note 140 and accompanying text.
137 CRISIS Report at 324 (cited in note 1).
' Bruce W. McConnell & Edward J. Appel, Co-Chairs, Interagency Working Group
on Cryptography Policy, Draft Paper: Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public
Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure 23 (May 20, 1996) ("White Paper") (avail-
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The policy sketched in the White Paper represents a signifi-
cant departure from Clipper and software key escrow, and not
only because for the first time the government made it clear that
it was prepared to allow "export of products of any bit length" to
foreign markets whose governments have legislated escrow re-
quirements that are at least as comprehensive as the ones pro-
posed for the U.S.139 The White Paper also promises to allow
self-escrow-but only for corporations, not individuals, and only
so long as the escrow facility meets rigorous performance stan-
dards. The self-escrow standards repeat those proposed earlier
for other escrow agents, 4 ' with the additional requirement that
there be some guarantee that the person who would be replying
to a request for keys would be someone other than the likely
target of an investigation.
The most significant element of the new plan, however, is
that instead of attempting to define standards for key escrow in
hardware or software, the White Paper suggests that the govern-
ment may attempt to require that escrow be built into the infor-
mation infrastructure needed for secure electronic commerce. To
fully appreciate the significance of the White Paper's attempt to
use electronic commerce as the lever to promote key escrow re-
quires some familiarity with public-key cryptography"4 and its
use in electronic commerce.' In a public-key cryptosystem,
messages encrypted with one key can be decrypted only with a
able from Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President and
available online at http'/www.isse.gmu.edu/-pfarrell/nist/kmi.html).
The Administration reaffirmed its commitment to the policy outlined in the draft
White Paper in a statement issued by Vice President Al Gore on June 12, 1996. See
Statement of Vice President Al Gore, http'//csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/admin.txt. See
also John Markoff, Clinton Proposes Initiatives On the Scrambling of Data, NY Times 34
(July 13, 1996) (noting that administration was rejecting NRC recommendations); US
Cryptography Policy (U.S. government policy paper issued July 12, 1996) (cited in note
107).
" See White Paper at 7 (cited in note 138).
"4 See notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
141 Very compressed explanations appear in notes 40 (contrasting public-key cryptog-
raphy with symmetric-key cryptography) and 64 (describing use of public-key cryptogra-
phy to create a digital signature). Fuller explanations appear in A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor Is The Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, And The Constitution, 143 U Penn
L Rev 709, 890-94 (1995) (cited in note 7), and Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography
(John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed 1996) (cited in note 16).
142 On the use of cryptography in electronic commerce, see generally A. Michael
Froomkin, The Importance of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 Or L Rev
49 (1996) (cited in note 64). On electronic commerce and electronic cash, see generally A.
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 Pitt J L & Commerce 395 (1996).
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different key, and vice-versa. A strong public-key system is one in
which possession of both the encryption algorithm and one key
gives no useful information about the other key and thus no clues
as to how to decrypt the message." The system gets its name
from the idea that the user will publish one key, but keep the
other one secret. The world can use the public key to send mes-
sages that only the private-key owner can read; the private key
can be used to send messages that could only have been sent by
the key owner.
Secure communications are a prerequisite to the exchange of
sensitive commercial or financial information. Public-key cryptog-
raphy allows Alice and Bob to establish a secure line of communi-
cation over an insecure medium, such as the Internet. First, Alice
and Bob exchange the plaintext of their public keys. Then, Alice
and Bob can each encrypt their outgoing messages with the
other's public key and decrypt their received messages with their
own secret, private key. All Alice and Bob need to communicate
securely, therefore, is compatible encryption software and a se-
cure means of consummating the initial exchange of public keys.
Alas, without some source of independent confirmation, Alice
has no way of knowing whether an e-mailed key purporting to be
from Bob is from Bob or from an imposter. '"(Bob has the same
problem regarding Alice.) Thus, if Alice is prudent she will de-
mand some assurance that she is not e-mailing the details of a
tender offer or the PIN to her online bank account to a malicious
stranger who might seek to profit at her expense; this need for
assurance is one of the largest obstacles to widespread Internet-
based electronic commerce."
One means of providing assurance that a public key labeled
as Bob's really belongs to him and no one else is to set up one or
more secure registries of public keys, known as Certification
Authorities ("CAs"). 1" A CA might, for example, agree to list
public keys in its secure registry only if the person supplying the
key provides some identification to authenticate her claims about
' See Schneier, Applied Cryptography at 284-85, 318-20 (cited in note 16) (stating
that security of public-key systems depends on inability to factor large numbers rapidly or
on the continuing inability of mathematicians to solve the longstanding problem of calcu-
lating discrete logarithms).
" See id at 48-49 (describing "man in the middle" attack on secure communications).
" See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 51-55 (cited in note 64).
4 In addition to binding identities to keys, CAs may issue certificates attesting to
some fact about a key or a transaction, or timestamps proving that a document was in ex-
istence at a certain time. A more extensive treatment of these functions, and of the duties
and possible liabilities of CAs, appears in Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev 49 (cited in note 64).
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her identity;147 otherwise, someone might be tempted to deposit
a public key in the name of Bill Gates and then try to purchase
something expensive. Once the CA accepts Bob's identification
(and, in most scenarios, charges Bob a small fee), the CA under-
takes to supply a cryptographically unforgeable electronic cer-
tificate'" attesting that "Bob's key" is really his.
Because the CA's certificate is digitally signed with the CA's
private key, but is delivered by e-mail or via a World Wide Web
page, Alice will need a reliable copy of the CA's public key to
authenticate the certificate that certifies to the authenticity of
Bob's public key. In effect, the problem of relying on Bob's key is
transformed into the comparable problem of relying. on the CA's
key. This problem, however, is easier to solve because a CA, as a
repeat player, will have a much greater interest than Bob in
* providing an out-of-channel means of authenticating its key. The
CA might publish the text of its public key in the newspaper, 49
or the CA might arrange to have its public key delivered by a
trusted intermediary. A list of public keys authenticated by the
telephone company might, for example, be inserted into every
telephone bill.
Another way for a CA to give Alice the confidence she needs
is to have an identifying certificate from a second CA, certifying
the first CA's key. CAs that certify other CAs are said to partici-
pate in a certificate chain, with a root certificate at the bottom of
the tree. 5 ' Unfortunately, this just shifts the problem again,
onto the validity of the root certificate. Unless a source can be
"' The White Paper includes a misleading statement suggesting that the CA ordinari-
ly would want or need to "escrow" the user's private key or other information that would
allow access to the user's data or communications. In fact, none of the other models for a
PKI includes this feature. See note 162 and accompanying text.
' A certificate is a computer-based record which (1) identifies the CA issuing it; (2)
names, identifies, or describes an attribute of the subscriber; (3) contains the subscribers's
public key; and (4) is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it. Warwick
Ford, Advances in Public-Key Certificate Standards, 13 SIG Security, Audit & Control
Review at 9 (July 1995). See also Utah Digital Signature Act § 103, Utah Code Ann § 46-
3-103(3) (1996).
14' A printed public key is likely to be a long string of gibberish. To make life easier
for the user, the CA probably would publish a short alphanumeric string, sometimes
called a "key fingerprint," which could be checked against the electronic form of the full
key. See Schneier, Applied Cryptography at 30-31 (cited in note 16).
15 Ford, Advances at 9-10 (cited in note 148).
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found for the root certificate that gets its trust from outside the
insecure network, it is turtles all the way down. 5'
The White Paper's escrow proposal contemplates the federal
government issuing the root certificate for a national Public-Key
Infrastructure ("PKI"). CAs that meet licensing requirements
would be rewarded with government certification of their keys.
These CAs in turn would issue certificates to other CAs, and so
on. 52 That the government might issue the root certificate is
not especially controversial,' although it may or may not be of
enormous practical significance unless backed by legislation if
users prefer flatter certification hierarchies. Many certificates in
the private sector might be self-signed or supported by at most
one outside organization. The smaller the number of CAs in-
volved in checking the validity of a certificate, the less effort
required to confirm the validity of a certificate.' Of course, if
participants in the government-certificate hierarchy receive valu-
able benefits, for example reduced exposure to liability for erro-
neous certificates, 5 5 every CA may want to have its key in a
certification chain with the government at its root whatever the
increased overhead costs. If federal legislation required that CAs
be licensed and that a CA be in the government-backed certifi-
cate chain to be eligible for a license, then the government's pre-
diction that users will choose a multilevel hierarchy would be-
come a self-fulfilling prophecy.
"' The canonical law review version of the turtle story goes as follows:
William James described a classic encounter between scientific truth and a
committment of faith. A prominent scientist had just given a brilliant lecture on
the foundations of the universe. During the question period [a person] suggested
that there was a problem with the professor's analysis. 'What is that?' asked the
professor cautiously. 'It's all wrong,' [the person] replied, 'because the universe'
actually rests on the back of a giant turtle.' The professor, taken aback, forced a
smile and then countered: 'If that's the case there is still the question, what is
that turtle standing on?' The audience tittered, but [the person], undaunted,
replied: 'Another, much larger turtle.' 'But. . . ' objected the professor. 'I'm sor-
ry, professor, it's turtles all the way down.'
Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Georgetown L J 1, 1-2 (1986).
152 White Paper at Appendix I (cited in note 138).
For example, the Utah Digital Signature Act contemplates that the state govern-
ment will issue the root certificate for CAs licensed in Utah. See Utah Code Ann §§ 46-3-
201(1), 46-3-201(2) (1996).
1' See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 54-61 (cited in note 64).
"' The White Paper proposes legislation ensuring that CAs "who exercise due pru-
dence' receive "liability protection." White Paper at 10 (cited in note 138). In the absence
of such legislation the liability of CAs for erroneous certificates is complex, uncertain, and
potentially large. See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 82-85 (cited in note 64).
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Some analysts suggest that as much as 15 percent of all
consumer purchases may be electronic by the turn of the centu-
ry,56 but this is unlikely without an information infrastructure
that enables secure communication and transactions.157 Thus,
the Interagency Working Group's suggestion that access to the
PKI might be denied to users of unescrowed cryptography is of
critical significance. In its starkest form, this proposal could
amount to saying that any U.S. resident who refuses to submit to
key escrow will be cut out of the emerging electronic market.
Whether the government intends such a stark result is un-
certain, both because the White Paper is only a draft and because
the report itself is unclear at key points. The White Paper offers
principles that it asserts "need to be accepted by government,
industry, and other users."15 Some of these proposed principles
are vague; others are certain to be controversial.
The White Paper proposes that the government promote the
development of a PKI, but it makes key escrow the price of ad-
mission:
To participate in the network a user needs a public key
certificate signed by a CA which "binds" the user's iden-
tity to their public key. One condition of obtaining a
certificate is that sufficient information (e.g., private
keys or other information as appropriate) has been
escrowed with a certified escrow authority to allow ac-
cess to a user's data or communications.5 9
The italicized portion of this assertion is unique to the White
Paper. No other proposal for a public-key infrastructure currently
being discussed in the U.S. requires that all users divulge their
private keys to a CA or anyone else. 60 On the contrary, while
other proposals anticipate that users seeking an identifying cer-
1 Where E-Cash Will Take Off, Business Week 70 (June 12, 1995). Another estimate
suggests more than $200 billion in Internet commerce within five years. See John
Kavanagh, Purchases on the Internet Could Potentially Exceed $200bn by Year 2000, Fin
Times FTIT XII (Nov 1, 1995) (quoting wide variety of estimates). Internet purchases in
1994 were estimated at $240 million. Id. See also Edward Mozley Roche, Business Value
of Electronic Commerce over Interoperable Networks, Paper Presented at Freedom Forum,
July 6-7, 1995, available online at http/www.commerce.net/information/reference/
roche.txt (projecting huge increases in internet commerce).
'7 See generally Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev 49 (cited in note 64).
1 White Paper at 3 (cited in note 138).
159 Id at 5 (emphasis added).
Examples include the ABA digital-signature guidelines and the various states' digi-
tal-signature legislation. See note 175 and accompanying text.
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tificate will have to give the CA evidence of their identity so that
the CA can issue the certificate in good faith, they also make it
clear that the user has a duty to safeguard the secrecy of her
private key.'61 The White Paper blurs the difference between
showing a CA a passport or a corporate resolution granting sig-
nature authority to an individual, and giving an outside au-
thority the ability to intercept all of one's communication.
The White Paper qualifies its general assertion that private
keys must be divulged to the CA or an escrow agent with a foot-
note stating that it "applies only to keys used for confidentiality
purposes and not keys used for signing purposes."'62 Indeed, no
legitimate law enforcement or intelligence purpose could be
served by giving the government or anyone else access to the
digital-signature private keys belonging to either citizens or cor-
porations.'63 A digital signature is appended to the cleartext of
a message and uniquely identifies the author while unforgeably
authenticating the text to anyone who possesses the correspond-
ing public key. Giving Bob or Uncle Sam access to Alice's digital-
signature key would allow them to impersonate Alice. As digital
signatures become integrated into electronic commerce, a pos-
sessor of Alice's private digital-signature key will be able to emp-
ty her bank account, sign her name to contracts, and affix a sig-
nature she will be hard-put to disclaim to the most detailed
"confession" of horrible crimes."
The Interagency Working Group ("IWG") should be corn-
mended for recognizing that, whatever one thinks of the needs of
law enforcement and others for access to the contents of encrypt-
ed communications, giving anyone a means of access to digital
signature keys would undermine confidence in the uniqueness of
the digital signature. Oddly, the IWG does not seem to have
recognized that this essential caveat creates a technical problem
that threatens to undermine the idea of an escrowed PKI. While
it is true that some digital signature keys can be used only to
sign documents, other algorithms including the RSA algo-
161 See id.
162 White Paper at 6 n 3 (cited in note 138).
'"3 See notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
's4 See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 108-110 (cited in note 64) (describing proposals to
shift burden of proof so that digital signatures backed by a valid certificate will be pre-
sumed to have been affixed by person identified in the certificate). Digital-signature keys
"must be controlled solely by the immediate and intended parties to those applications"
because "outside access to such keys could undermine the legal basis and threaten the
integrity of these practices carried out in the electronic domain." CRISIS Report at 326-27
(cited in note 1).
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rithm,'" which is the de facto industry standard, use keys that
are equally effective for signing or encrypting documents." The
Interagency Working Group is left with a Hobson's choice. Either
it plans to require escrow of every certificate-backed long, strong,
key that can be used either for signing or encryption-and in so
doing plans to reduce confidence in the uniqueness of signatures
with RSA, one of the most widely used encryption algorithms-or
it will allow the PKI to host nonescrowed digital-signature keys
that can easily be used to subvert the escrow procedure.
A similar uncertainty as to the Interagency Working Group's
actual goals emerges from the principle in its report that should
be the least controversial: "Participation in the [key management
infrastructure] will be voluntary."'67 Unfortunately, in the con-
text of the entire White Paper it is difficult to understand wheth-
er the Interagency Working Group means anything more than
the truism that no one will be forced to use public-key cryptog-
raphy. It is particularly unclear whether the Interagency Work-
ing Group contemplates allowing alternate certificate hierarchies
using strong cryptography to exist, and what burdens it hopes to
place on any alternatives that survive.
The Interagency Working Group seems to believe that the
nongovernmental, escrow-free certificate hierarchies currently
being deployed by various private firms should not be allowed to
exist beyond a transition period in which "legacy equipments
which do not support key recovery"-that is, key escrow--"can be
used to communicate with users" of the escrowed PKI. 68 Appar-
ently, although the report never says so in so many words, the
Interagency Working Group believes that after the transition
period is over nonescrowed keys will be excluded from the PKI,
and the PKI will be designed so that cryptographic products that
do not require escrow are prevented from communicating with it.
Exactly how this might be achieved is not explained. One
possibility is that the Administration might seek legislation im-
posing licensing requirements for CAs that require key escrow.
The Interagency Working Group states that "Certificate authori-
ties will operate within performance standards set by law"'69
and that "CAs must meet minimum standards for security, per-
" See note 111 and accompanying text.
1 See CRISIS Report at 6-9 (cited in note 1).
167 White Paper at 3 (cited in note 138).
" Id.
69 Id at 4.
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formance, and liability. A Policy Approving Authority (PAA) certi-
fies CAs for operation. The PAA sets rules and responsibilities
for ... setting CA performance criteria to meet law enforcement
needs."7 ! This statement could mean that escrow-equipped CAs
will have to demonstrate they are ready, willing, and able to
provide keys or key fragments, when required to do so. Or, it
might mean something more, for example that the PAA will not
certify CAs that refuse to escrow their subscribers' private keys
and that these CAs will be ineligible for whatever liability safe
harbor the rules offer. A third possibility is that CAs that refuse
to escrow keys will not be allowed to operate at all. This last
version sits oddly with the idea of voluntary participation in the
PKI. Even if the PAA is benign, its ability to prescribe policies,
and the consequences for CAs of noncompliance, would give the
PAA the ability to implement restrictive requirements if a new
administration were to decide upon a more restrictive policy.1
71
The most perplexing statement in the White Paper may be
that "Products that operate with an escrowed [public key-man-
agement infrastructure] need to be developed with industry tak-
ing the lead."7 1 Industry is already "taking the lead" in devel-
oping a national key management infrastructure without key es-
crow.17 The Interagency Working Group apparently hopes that
it can change this behavior by allowing escrowed products with
strong encryption to be exported; if that fails, the threat in re-
serve is that the national PKI will not communicate with prod-
ucts that do not escrow keys. Neither of these inducements ap-
pears sufficiently powerful to produce much of a groundswell for
escrow in the face of customer resistance. Export controls matter
less to the utility of a PKI than to cryptosystems in general, since
the certificates can be freely exported even if the software that
produces them cannot. Admittedly, foreign users will not be able
to check the validity of a certificate unless they are able to secure
a foreign supply of compatible encryption software or hardware.
This possibility, however, seems increasingly likely, and means
that even foreign users will be able to use U.S. certificates (or
that U.S. users will end up buying a foreign product). The domes-
tic market may in any case become large enough to support a
170 Id at 6 (emphasis added).
"' See CRISIS Report at 329 (cited in note 1) (noting fears of critics of escrow that
future administrations may change policy).
172 White Paper at 3 (cited in note 138).
17 See, for example, Verisign Homepage, http://www.verisign.com.
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large, unescrowed PKI. Similarly, the absence of a government
root certificate may be of only marginal consequence so long as
nonmembers of the escrowed PKI are otherwise able to compete
on a level playing field with CAs that escrow. The domestic mar-
ket appears capable of growing its own public-key infrastruc-
ture-indeed, several competing ones-without a government-
approved authority to supply a root certificate. Netscape, for
example, includes a certificate option in version 3.0 of its browser
software and allows the user to select which of several types of
certificates she wishes to accept.174 So long as the government
does not require them to conform to its policies, private CAs may
not care whether they are excluded from the official PKI. On the
other hand, if only licensed, escrow-compliant CAs benefit from
safe harbors from liability, noncompliant CAs may face signifi-
cant competitive disadvantages.
The White Paper contemplates a federal role in designing a
national public-key infrastructure. Several states, including
Utah, Washington, Florida, and California, have already passed
digital signature legislation of varying degrees of precision, and
other states are considering following suit.175 The Utah and
Washington acts provide safe harbors from liability for CAs that
comply with relatively strict rules regarding bonding, auditing,
and performance; CAs that do not comply are left to the tender
mercies of the common law. 7 ' The Interagency Working Group
proposes national legislation "establishing liability protection for
certificate authorities who exercise due prudence in the fulfill-
ment of their performance obligations,"177 but its report does
not address the federalism issue. If, however, it becomes federal
policy to disadvantage CAs that are insufficiently attentive to-
wards the federal interest in key escrow, the federal law may
need to preempt existing and anticipated state efforts to create a
"74 The current list offers users a choice among certificates issued by BNN, the U.S.
Postal Service, VeriSign, Keywitness, Thawte Server, MCI Mall, Canada Post Corpora-
tion, GTE CyberTrust, AT&T Directory Services, and CommerceNET.
"' See, for example, Utah Code Ann § 46-3-103 et seq (1996). As of November 1995,
no certification authorities had qualified under the Utah Act. See Introductory Commen-
tary, History and Current Status of the Utah Act § 1, available online at
http:/www.state.ut.us/ccij/digsig/dsut-int.htm. The state of California has passed a statute
delegating to the Secretary of State powers to make rules regulating the use and verifica-
tion of digital signatures. See 1995 Cal Legis Serv Ch 594, AB 1577, 1995-96 Reg Sess ch
594, 3584-85 (West). On March 29, 1996, Washington State approved a digital-signatures
statute with an effective date of January 1, 1998. See Washington Electronic Authentica-
tion Act, 1996 Wash Legis Serv SB 6423, 1996 Reg Sess ch 250 (West).
171 See generally Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev 49 (cited in note 64).
177 White Paper at 10 (cited in note 138).
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hospitable legal climate for CAs. Whether or not it preempts
state law, national legislation might encourage standardization
among CAs' policies, which could tend to have a healthy effect on
electronic commerce.
178
Any PKI-based escrow scheme would require federal legisla-
tion to determine a number of issues, including:
" the extent of a Title III exemption for escrow agents;
" liability rules for escrow agents; and
- the establishment of the PAA as a federal agency.
Indeed, the Interagency Working Group acknowledges that legis-
lation may be needed to ensure that if an organization acts as its
own escrow agent, the person holding the keys is prohibited from
tipping off a target that it is the subject of an investigation.
179
The draft report also notes that legislation should criminalize the
unauthorized disclosure or use of an escrowed key and create a
civil remedy for an aggrieved keyholder.
C. Possible Moves Towards Global Escrow
International efforts to restrict unescrowed cryptography
may be growing just as the domestic pressure increases to relax
export control. Indeed, the phenomena may be related in either of
two ways. The combination of the ITAR with the U.S. dominance
of the mass-market software industry allowed foreign govern-
ments to avoid the cryptography issue. In effect, U.S. export
control also functioned as import control for foreign governments.
Other countries had less need for an explicit ban on strong con-
sumer cryptography because U.S. firms' dominance of the market
for operating systems and other potential applications of cryptog-
raphy tended to stifle the growth of indigenous competitors.' °
As it becomes increasingly likely that the ITAR will be relaxed,
or possibly even eliminated,' foreign governments may feel in-
creased pressure to grapple with the cryptography issue.'82 Al-
17' See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev 49 (cited in note 64).
171 White Paper at 9 (cited in note 138).
" Export controls have never been sufficiently well-policed to prevent individuals
from carrying out software on disks or computers, or from e-mailing software across
borders on the Internet. But, unless one is personally able to check the validity and
implementation of an algorithm, one must take cryptographic software on trust. Most
firms find it easier to trust something that comes in a box with a famous tradename on it
than something illegally exported via the Internet. See Froomkin, 75 Or L Rev at 54 nn
20-21 (cited in note 64).
181 See note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Bernstein decision).
See Stewart A. Baker, Summary Report on the OECD Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts
on Cryptography, http'/www.us.net/-steptoe/276908.htm (1996). A survey of foreign laws
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ternately, the increased interest of some foreign governments in
sponsoring international controls on strong cryptography might
be the result of a U.S. government effort to jumpstart domestic
escrow policy by orchestrating an international clamor for a do-
mestic policy that otherwise would be more difficult to sell.
Foreign governments have expressed interest in controlling
the use of strong cryptography within their borders. France "has
the most comprehensive cryptologic control and use regime in
Europe, and possibly worldwide,""8 although these laws are gen-
erally not enforced.' 8" France recently passed legislation to re-
lax its currently strict control on the domestic use of encryption
products-but only if a key to the product is escrowed in France
with one of a small number of escrow agents certified by the
French government."8 Russia has not yet embraced escrow, but
Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree banning unau-
thorized encryption.'86 The edict bans the development, import,
sale, and use of unlicensed encryption devices, as well as
"protected technological means of storage, processing and trans-
mission of information."
8 7
In contrast, the current UK policy statement begins with the
promise that it "is not the intention of the Government to regu-
late the private use of encryption"' although it goes on to de-
scribe a system of licensing and regulation for trusted third par-
ties so as to "engender trust" in them while balancing "the com-
mercial requirement for robust encryption services," the need to
protect users, and the need of "intelligence and law enforcement
relating to encryption can be found at Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey, http'J/
cwis.kub.nl/-frw/people/koops/lawsurvey.htm (1996). Foreign laws on the exportation of
cryptographic software are surveyed in Export Study (cited in note 9).
1 Export Study at I-17 (cited in note 9).
' CRISIS Report at 436 (cited in note 1).
1 See La loi sur les tdlecoms met l'Internet en laisse, bulletin lambda 2.08 (June 10,
1996) (available online at http://www.freenix.fr/netizen/208.html) (describing Article 12 of
new telecommunications law and noting passage of legislation in the dead of night);
Jerome Thorel, As French Hang a Leash on the Net, Military Interests Surface, http:/
www.tis.com/crypto/cke/press/french.txt (June 14, 1996); Steptoe & Johnson, Proposed
Statutory Trusted Third Party Rules for Encryption, http//www.us.net/~steptoe/france.htm
(analyzing proposed version of law).
" Edict of the President of the Russian Federation On Measures to Observe the Law in
Development, Production, Sale and Use of Encrypting Information, http'//www.us.net/
-steptoe/edict.htm (Apr 3, 1995).
" Steptoe & Johnson, Russian Statutes Restricting Use of Encryption Technologies,
http'/www.us.net/-steptoe/cyber.htm (1996) (quoting Edict cited in note 186).
"' UK Department of Trade and Industry, Paper On Regulatory Intent Concerning
Use Of Encryption On Public Networks 8, http'//www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GTI/
coi9303b.ok (June 10, 1996)
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authorities to retain the effectiveness of warranted intercep-
tion."'89 Japanese policy appears to be moving even further in
the direction of decontrol. Former NSA General Counsel Stewart
Baker describes a market-driven "emerging Japanese consensus"
that encryption is a major technology essential to "Japan's pene-
tration of the Global Information Infrastructure" and warns that
unless Japanese policy alters as a result of participation in inter-
national policy discussions it "could pose a major challenge" to
U.S. escrow policy.190
At the international level, the European Union ("EU") has
proposed a project to establish a European network of trusted
third parties under the control of member nations that seems to
resemble the UK proposal. In the EU scheme users may choose
to deposit their keys with trusted third parties, in which case the
keys are subject to subpoena, but the EU proposal does not sug-
gest that escrow should be mandatory.'91 In 1995 the Council of
Europe resolved that member nations' criminal procedure laws
should be "reviewed with a view to making possible the intercep-
tion of telecommunications and the collection of traffic data in
the investigation of serious offenses against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of telecommunications or computer
systems."'92 The same resolution also advised that "[m]easures
should be considered to minimise the negative effects of the use
of cryptography on the investigation of criminal offenses, without
affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly necessary."
193
Where the line should be drawn, and whether governments
should do more than "consider" the measures, the resolution does
not say.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment ("OECD") intends to negotiate multilateral cryptography
guidelines by the end of 1996.' OECD deliberations are not
open to the public, and there appears to be no public information
about the likely shape of the guidelines. The OECD did, however,
hold public meetings with outside experts in Canberra, Paris,
Id T 5, 7.
190 Stewart A. Baker, Emerging Japanese Encryption Policy, httpJ/www.us.net/
-steptoe/276915.htm (1996).
"' See Denning, Comments on the NRC Cryptography Report (cited in note 134)
(describing as-yet-unpublished EU proposals).
" Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedure Law Connected with Information
Technology, Council of Europe Recommendation No R (95) 13 at Appendix 1 8, (Sept 11,
1995) (available online at httpJ/www.privacy.org/pi/intLorgs/coe/infotech_1995.html).
193 Id at Appendix 1 14.
19 White Paper at 8 (cited in note 138).
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and Washington, D.C. Some participants in those meetings re-
port that the OECD seems to be considering an escrow-based
system,195 but another says that the governments did not ap-
pear to be in agreement: Scandinavian countries were "prominent
among the doubters," and "Japan also showed little interest in
controlling encryption."96 The official U.S. government position
is that "We are encouraged ... by recent discussions we have
had at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) that are leading to international cryptography
management principles which support [key escrow]." 97
Whatever it decides, the OECD resolution is likely to be
influential. If the OECD member nations were to unite in favor
of escrow, it would greatly aid the U.S. government's attempt to
make key escrow the norm. The lack of reliable information
about the OECD proceedings highlights a key point about the
OECD as a forum for deciding social policy. It is not a democratic
organization. The executive branch of the U.S. government se-
lects the U.S. delegation; the U.S. delegation will presumably
reflect existing U.S. policy. The executive branch is committed to
escrow, although there is little evidence that Congress has a
considered view of the issue. Nor is there much evidence that the
issue has popular salience, although the U.S. escrow policy has a
small and, it seems, growing band of opponents drawn from the
software industry and the civil liberties lobby. As a result, the
195 See CRISIS Report at 448-49 (cited in note 1) (stating that a "number of partici-
pants" favored trusted-third-party approach to escrow, although needs of national security
"were not mentioned for the most part"). Steve Walker, the founder of Trusted Informa-
tion Systems, a leading supplier of escrowed encryption systems, reported that,
The consensus of the [December 1995 Paris] meeting was that user-controlled
key escrow provides the only workable solution to the long-standing dilemma
between the private sector's need for encryption protection and governments'
needs to be able to decrypt the communications of criminals, terrorists, and
other adversaries. Other meetings will follow, but it appears that most major
governments endorse the U.S. government's user-controlled key escrow initiative
as the only practical way through the cryptography maze.
TIS-Building in Big Brother for a Better Tomorrow,
http'J/infiity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-96.02.22-96.02.28/0114.html (e-mail from
Steve Walker, Feb 2, 1996, quoted in e-mail from John Young, Feb 22, 1996, to
cypherpunks@toad.com).
19 Stewart A. Baker, Summary Report on the OECD Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts on
Cryptography, http'/www.us.net/-steptoe/276908.htm (1996).
191 US Cryptography Policy: Why We Are Taking the Current Approach (cited in note
107).
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executive branch is selling, and helping to shape, an internation-
al policy that does not have wide support at home.
The OECD has no legislative power of its own. Any OECD
resolution would need to be implemented by appropriate U.S.
legislation or regulation. The ITAR (to the extent that they are
constitutional) derive from valid statutes, but neither Clipper,
software key escrow, nor the White Paper approach have been
approved or authorized by Congress. It is unlikely to have es-
caped U.S. policy makers that one way to sell escrow to a poten-
tially skeptical Congress is to present it as the considered fruit of
an international consensus against a common threat of lawless-
ness or terrorism. Those who believe the escrow policy is right
are likely to call this statecraft; those who disagree would proba-
bly use a different term.
IV. THE TRUST DEFICIT
The struggle over encryption policy is bound up in hopes and
fears. The government warns of projected crime waves and feared
losses to intelligence gathering. Neither, so far as one can tell,
has yet to come to pass. Nevertheless the Administration appar-
ently considers the risk sufficiently great to justify complex
maneuvers to shape the development of a nascent industry.
Meanwhile, would-be producers and exporters of cryptographic
products forecast immense sales, and suggest that cryptography
will be built in to any important commercial or social activity
that involves a computer. To date, however, the dollar value of
cryptographic sales remains fairly low. For their part, cyber-sav-
vy civil libertarians suggest that encryption is a tool that, de-
ployed sufficiently widely, can protect citizens against unwar-
ranted government and corporate intrusions into personal lives.
So far, however, a sufficiently large critical mass of users has yet
to appear. Thus, each of these perspectives involves an extrapola-
tion. Each vision projects a future in which different hopes or
fears predominate. Each vision, however, shares a common sup-
position that cryptography's importance to society will increase
dramatically.
The "widespread [nongovernment] use of cryptography in the
United States and abroad is inevitable in the long run."9 ' The
"' National Research Council, Kenneth Dam and Herb Lin, eds, Cryptography's Role
in Securing the Information Society 4-6 (National Academy Press, 1996) ("CRISIS Report")
(cited in note 1).
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Chairman of the National Research Council's cryptography-policy
study committee, Kenneth Dam, is surely correct when he de-
scribes the response to this reality as being more a policy crisis
than a technology crisis.199 As the committee stated,
National cryptography policy should be developed by
the executive and legislative branches on the basis of
open public discussion and governed by the rule of law.
Only a national discussion of the issues involved in
national cryptography policy can result in the broadly
acceptable social consensus that is necessary for any
policy in this area to succeed. A consensus derived from
such deliberations, backed by explicit legislation when
necessary, will lead to greater degrees of public accep-
tance and trust, a more certain planning environment,
and better connections between policy makers and the
private sector on which the nation's economy and social
fabric rest.00
This is a tall assignment. The key-escrow debate is a particu-
larly acute product of a trust deficit that is national in scope and
extends far beyond cryptography. Secrets are most appealing
when trust is lacking. Rational citizens concerned about state
intrusions into their privacy will be more likely to clamor for the
type of protection that cryptography offers as their trust in the
state decreases. In a democratic society where many citizens'
trust in government and other institutions has been badly
bruised, if not shattered, °1 only the most democratic, straight-
forward, and open process of policy formation could hope to per-
suade people that the government deserves to have the means to
hear every conversation and read every document--even when
the government requires legal process to do so. The number of
lawful wiretaps is increasing annually,0 2 and one can expect
even more rapid increases if computer-aided speech and voice
19 Id at xiii.
Id at 8-10.
o See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Penn L Rev 709, 732-34 (1995) (cited in note 7) (dis-
cussing abuses by law enforcement and intelligence agencies); Richard Morin & Dan Balz,
Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and Institutions; Suspicion of Strangers Breeds
Widespread Cynicism, Wash Post Al (Jan 28, 1996) (describing poll showing that U.S.
citizens have profound lack of trust in government and other institutions).
See Jim McGee, Wiretapping Rises Sharply Under Clinton, Wash Post Al (July 7,
1996).
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print recognition improve to the point that expensive human
interventions can be decreased.2"3
The more that citizens feel they cannot trust the state, the
more reason the state may have to fear its citizens. The more
that the state fears its citizens, the more citizens may come to
believe that they have something to fear from the state. Percep-
tions can become as important as realities. The state may seek
expansive surveillance capabilities because it is sincerely con-
cerned about a foreign threat, or about domestic terrorism. Once
citizens engage in "threat analysis" of their government, however,
they may see themselves as possible targets of surveillance.
The Administration's hopes of persuading the nation that the
government should be trusted with the means of acquiring the
people's secrets have been undermined by differences in opinion
within the Administration. As a result, the Administration has
been unable to speak with one voice. For example, soon after the
White House announced that the Administration had no plans to
restrict the use of cryptography within the U.S., FBI Director
Freeh commented that "[i]f five years from now... what we are
hearing is all encrypted material that the FBI is unable to deci-
pher, then the policy of relying on voluntary compliance with




The Administration has also been hampered by the inconsis-
tency and lack of clarity that characterize its proposals. First the
Administration seeks to manipulate markets to achieve its ob-
jects. Then it celebrates the role of "industry taking the lead" in
developing escrowed products. Then it proposes a new agency, a
PAA,205 with a vague mandate to regulate an important seg-
ment of industry. Meanwhile, agencies such as NIST and the In-
teragency Working Group organize elaborate consultation pro-
cesses, solicit input from affected industries and the public, and
then ignore most of what is said.
One can wonder whether any process of policy formation
could be equal to the challenge of persuading fin de si~cle Ameri-
ca to trust the government with its secrets. So far the process
has certainly not been up to the job. Instead of being part of a
carefully framed national cryptography policy, Clipper, software
key escrow, and the White Paper represent hastily designed, if
203 See Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 806 (cited in note 7).
204 Louis Freeh, Keynote Luncheon Address at the International Cryptography Institute
(Sept 23, 1994) (excerpt on fie with the Legal Forum).
211 See note 172.
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nonetheless technically and bureaucratically elegant, stopgaps in
the face of a worldwide cryptographic upheaval. Although the
Administration's actions have remained carefully within the
letter of the law, its tactics have been too manipulative to have
any hope of seeming legitimate. Clipper sought to use govern-
ment standard-setting and buying power to rig the encryption
market. Software key escrow sought to hitch escrow to business's
need for data security. Now, the White Paper proposes that es-
crow be built into the sinews of electronic commerce.
Clipper was rejected, and software key escrow is unlikely to
have a major effect on the market even if it is not abandoned. It
is too soon to tell what will happen to the attempt to build es-
crow into the PKI proposed by the White Paper, but the number
of unanswered questions, and the inherent tension between the
White Paper's emphasis on control and its emphasis on market
solutions, suggest this policy too will either evolve or die (or
both). Whether any of these policies would be publicly acceptable
is perhaps open to debate; none deserves to win public acceptance
without a Congressional imprimatur.
The past few years have seen cryptographic policy being
formed in a semi-open manner. Policies have been developed in
secrecy and without consultation,"°6 but they have then been
announced openly before they went into effect. Public meetings
have been held to discuss them-even if afterwards it was often
unclear whether the meetings had any significant effect on the
results. Information about the government's plans may not have
sufficed to cure the trust deficit, but it did allow those opposed to
the Administration's proposals to learn what they were and thus
to organize their response. In this sense, the move to policy for-
mation at the international level just when the national policy is
being contested risks being a retrograde and undemocratic step.
The Administration's concession in the White Paper that
legislation will be needed to establish a domestic cryptography-
control policy represents a quiet turning point in the U.S. cryp-
tography debate, and may provide the means of defusing the
crisis. Until now the Administration has worked hard to keep
Congress out of the policy loop. Clipper was designed to be for-
mally voluntary and to work through market manipulation. It
could be implemented without any legislation. Software key es-
crow required at most technical legislation to regularize the
20 See CRISIS Report at 188 (cited in note 1) (noting comments of relevant
stakeholders who felt that policies were "sprung" on them).
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rights and duties of private escrow agents. Most of the policy
could be implemented administratively, by issuing a FIPS and by
modifying the administration of the ITAR. Again, the Congressio-
nal role wag minimized.
The White Paper proposes policies that cannot be implement-
ed without Congressional approval. It does so at a time when
Congress seems, for the first time, to be focusing serious atten-
tion on the cryptography policy debate although no consensus has
yet emerged. Some legislators have proposed bills that would
decontrol cryptography2 7 ; others suggest imposing domestic cryp-
tography controls.2 °s  The publication of the National
Cryptography Study not only removes an excuse for further Con-
gressional delay, but provides middle-of-the-road proposals
around which at least a temporary compromise might be fash-
ioned. °9
The entry of Congress into the field of debate is surely a
healthy development. Its participation should add democratic
legitimacy to whatever policy is decided, a legitimacy that the
executive's creations could never attain alone. That said, it is
difficult to be sanguine about the chances that Congress will add
much to the quality of the policy being formed. Congress's track
record in this area is far from stellar, both on substantive and
procedural grounds. The Digital Telephony Act, which requires
that all telephone switching networks be made wiretap-friendly if
the government pays for the modifications, was rushed through
both houses of Congress with next to no debate shortly before the
end of the 1994 legislative session.210 The next Congress, how-
ever, balked at appropriating the half a billion or more dollars it
207 See Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996, S 1587, 104th Congress, 2nd
Sess (1996); Promotion Of Commerce On-line In The Digital Era (PRO-CODE) Act Of
1996, S 1726 (1996); Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, H R 3011
(1996).
2"8 Senator Grassley introduced the Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act (June 27, 1995),
which would prohibit distribution of unescrowed computer software "that encodes or
encrypts electronic or digital communications to computer networks that the person
distributing the software knows or reasonably should know, is [sic] accessible" to for-
eigners. For a discussion of the highly debatable constitutionality of a domestic ban on
unescrowed cryptography, see Froomkin, 143 U Penn L Rev at 810-43 (cited in note 7).
20" The Report was attacked in surprisingly gentle terms by both partisans of escrow
and partisans of complete decontrol. Compare note 134 and accompanying text with note
135 and accompanying text.
20 47 USC § 1001 et seq (1994). See 140 Cong Rec S14666 (Oct 7, 1994) (reporting the
Senate's passage of the bill by voice vote); 140 Cong Rec H10917 (Oct 5, 1994) (reporting
the House's passage of the bill by two-thirds vote).
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would have taken to implement the retrofitting required by the
act.
The publication of the National Research Council's report,
Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society, is the
most encouraging development in the cryptography debate. The
report emphasizes that national security is enhanced by the
widespread use of encryption to secure personal and corporate
data and to protect computer-controlled operations, such as elec-
tricity generation and power supplies. The report makes clear
that these gains deserve to be weighed in the balance. Because
widespread cryptography is inevitable, the only loss to U.S. law
enforcement and intelligence-gathering capabilities is the short-
term, but immediate, loss from abandoning efforts to stem the
tide. Given this forecast, the report concludes that the gains from
allowing free export of DES outweigh the short term losses suf-
fered above the inevitable long-term losses.2 1'
Reasonable people may differ with some of the National
Research Council's recommendations,212 but they form a solid
starting point for an informed debate. On July 12, 1996, however,
the Administration announced that its fundamental commitment
to an escrow policy remained unchanged.213 The battle over
cryptographic key "escrow" is only beginning to heat up.
POSTSCRIPT: THE OCTOBER 1996 "INITIATIVE"
The White Paper bore its first fruit in the Clinton
Administration's October 1996 cryptographic policy initiative.
Although no formal actions had been taken at the time this arti-
cle went to press-neither executive orders nor proposed or final
regulations had been issued-the Administration let it be known
211 CRISIS Report (cited in note 1).
212 Indeed, I cannot resist noting that I strongly disagree with Recommendation 5.4:
"Congress should seriously consider legislation that would impose criminal penalties on
the use of encrypted communications in interstate commerce with the intent to commit a
federal crime." CRISIS Report at 332 (cited in note 1). Recommendation 5.4 is notably
more tentative than any other in the Report, and deservedly so. The goal of discouraging
the use of cryptography for illegitimate purposes is laudable, but the proposed statute is a
bad idea, badly thought out. There is no evidence that such a statute would deter the use
of cryptography in a world in which cryptography is seamlessly included in most e-mail
and telecommunications. While it is unclear what the effects of such a statute would be
once cryptographic tools become ubiquitous and invisible, the odds are that every federal
crime involving a communication would also violate the statute. The two federal crimes
would then be predicate RICO offenses, and so on ....
21' See Administration Statement on Commercial Encryption Policy,
http'./csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/admin.txt (July 12, 1996).
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that it planned to implement the new policy by executive order in
early 1997.
The October policy initiative had two major parts. First, the
Administration proposed to transfer primary jurisdiction over
cryptographic control from the U.S. Munitions List administered
by the traditionally more cautious State Department to the Com-
merce Control List, administered by the traditionally more ex-
port-oriented Commerce Department.214 Second, the Adminis-
tration proposed to allow temporary export of fifty-six-bit encryp-
tion products-i.e. of DES, the de facto global standard commer-
cial encryption product-but for no more than two years, and
only so long as the exporters promised "to build and market fu-
ture products that support key recovery 15," albeit with an op-
tion to have keys held by approved private parties rather than
the government. 16 Grants of export permission would be for six
months at a time, and would be contingent on "commitments
from exporters to explicit benchmarks and milestones for devel-
oping and incorporating key recovery features into their products
and services, and for building the supporting infrastructure inter-
nationally."217 In other words, companies that promise to build
key escrow products (for domestic use as well as international?)
will be allowed to export DES, but others will not. And all export-
ers will be on a short leash to ensure continued compliance.
A rigorous analysis of the revised policy is impossible before
the implementing regulations are issued, but some initial points
stand out. By allowing the virtually unlimited export of DES
products via the CCL list, the Administration would effectively
24 On the "subtle but nonetheless significant" effects of this change see Stewart A.
Baker & Peter Lichtenbaum, Cutting the Red Tape on Encryption, The Journal of Com-
merce 9A (Sept 27, 1996). For a description of the mechanics of the administration of the
two lists, see Ira S. Rubinstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in Coping with
U.S. Export Controls 1994 at 401 (PLI Coin Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No
A-705, 1994).
25 By using the term "key recovery" rather than "key escrow," the Administration
means to signal its acceptance of an alternate means of preserving its potential access to
keys. In a "key recovery" system, the user's private key is not stored with the escrow
agent. Instead, every message contains a LEAF-like structure which has the message's
session key encrypted with a public key belonging either to the escrow agent or to law
enforcement. Possession of the matching key still gives full access to all messages sent by
the user using the system, but it improves over the original Clipper proposal in that this
access does not provide the technical capability of forging a message that appears to
originate from the user.
2' White House, Office of the Vice-President, Statement of the Vice President, Oct 1,
1996, http://www.cdt.org/crypto/clipper3ll/96100l_Gore-stmnt.html.
217 Id.
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concede that additional exports of DES are not, in and of them-
selves, a serious incremental threat to the national security. In
addition, by limiting export permission to firms that prove they
are on board and contributing to the Administration's desire for
an escrow-enabled infrastructure, the policy also concedes the
bankruptcy of the claim that industry spontaneously is "taking
the lead"21 in developing escrowed products in response to con-
sumer demand.
The proposal to ration export licenses according to the busi-
ness plans or practices of applicants is especially troubling. Ordi-
narily (although, as discussed below, not at this moment), the
federal authority to control exports arises from two statutes, the
Export Administration Act219 and the Arms Export Control
Act.220 Neither of these statutes was intended to give the execu-
tive branch the authority to direct the industrial policy of the
United States, and neither act has ever been understood by any-
one involved in export control as giving the government that
power.2 ' The government might argue that national security
would in fact be improved by accelerating the development of
strong escrowed products. Or, more subtly, the government might
even argue that only the acceleration of development can miti-
gate the harm caused by exports of DES products, on the theory
that foreign consumers will migrate to the stronger albeit
escrowed products, leaving the unescrowed DES products as a
transitional nuisance. Even if one were to embrace these argu-
ments, however, it in no way follows that either the EAA or the
AECA gives the government the authority to implement a prefer-
ential export policy by which one's right to export one product de-
pends on one's plans to develop another. These are export control
statutes, not a blank check to conduct industrial policy.222
A further aspect of the initiative is also disturbing. The EAA
expired in August 1994. President Clinton immediately declared
a national emergency and issued Executive Order 12924 extend-
28 See notes 172 and 205 and accompanying text.
219 See note 20.
See note 19.
21 A would-be exporter denied permission to export a DES-based product would seem
to have a fairly strong case that the refusal to grant a license under the EAA was arbi-
trary and capricious, and therefore contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act. Unfor-
tunately for the would-be exporter, decisions under the EAA are not subject to judicial
review under the APA. See EAA, 50 USC App § 2412(a) (1988 & Supp V 1993).
'2 Compare Industrial Union Department v American Petroleum Inststitute, 448 US
607, 644 (1980) (refusing to find that Congress delegated "unprecedented power over
American industry" in the absence of a "clear mandate" in OSHA statute).
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ing the EAA "[t]o the extent permitted by law."223 The only au-
thorities noted in Executive Order 12924 are the President's
inherent constitutional authority and the International Emergen-
cy Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").2 Assuming that the Presi-
dent does not have inherent constitutional authority to block
exports in peacetime, the authority for this action is IEEPA,
which by its own terms applies to "any unusual and extraordi-
nary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States ... if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat."25 While Executive Or-
der 12924 refers to the danger of "unrestricted access of foreign
parties to U.S. goods, technology and technical data," it seems
that the real "unusual and extraordinary" threat consists of
Congress's failure to renew the EAA. Indeed, the President's
most recent renewal of the state of emergency admits that the
state of emergency must be extended "[b]ecause the Export Ad-
ministration Act has not been renewed by the Congress."22
While this is far from the first time that the EAA export
control regime has been continued by executive order after a
lapse in statutory authority, 27 there is nevertheless something
unsavory about a state of emergency being used for more than a
very short time to cover a Congressional refusal to reenact a
statute. An emergency of this sort that lasts more than one Con-
gress is suspect indeed. Others have suggested that IEEPA
should be amended to prevent the existence of "perpetual
emergencies,"28 and as it wears on they may find in this "emer-
gency" more evidence of the need for a reform.
Continuation of Export Control Regulations, Exec Order No 12924, 59 Fed Reg
43437 (1994). See also Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations,
61 Fed Reg 42527 (August 14, 1996).
24 50 USC § 1702 (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
IEEPA, § 202(a), 50 USC § 1701 (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
226 Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 61 Fed Reg
42527 (Aug 14, 1996).
227 The predecessor version of the EAA expired in September 1990 and was continued
in effect by President Bush, see Exec Order No 12730 (1990), 55 Fed Reg 40373 (Sept 30,
1990). Similarly, President Reagan kept the CCL regulations in force for more than a
year, from Exec Order No 12470 (March 30, 1984) until the repassage of the EAA in Pub
Law 99-64 (July 12, 1985). See Exec Order No 12525, 50 Fed Reg 28757 (July 12, 1985).
Exec Order No 12444, Oct 14, 1983, 48 Fed Reg 48215, which had provided for the con-
tinued effectiveness of the Export Administration Act of 1979, was revoked by Exec Order
No 12451, Dec 20, 1983, 48 Fed Reg 56563.
'2 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 197 (Yale
University Press, 1990).
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Given, however, that IEEPA provides the current authority
for the continuance of the EAA regime, and that the Clinton
Administration proposes to move DES, however temporarily, off
the USML and onto the CCL, a creation of the EAA,229 it seems
reasonable to ask to what extent IEEPA authorizes the October
Initiative and to what extent parties aggrieved by the new regu-
lations will be able to challenge them. Several challenges seem
possible. Indeed, as set out in more detail below, there is a strong
argument that IEEPA does not give the government the authori-
ty to control the export of cryptographic software once it has been
removed from the USML. Since the October Initiative involves
moving DES from the USML to the CCL, this may have the un-
intentional result of allowing unlimited export of DES-based
software.
First, while its terms are indeed sweeping, IEEPA is no more
a grant of the power to conduct industrial policy than is the EAA.
Second, IEEPA lacks the prohibition on judicial review in the
EAA. License denials premised on IEEPA can thus be challenged
under the APA, even if the IEEPA authority is being used to
extend the rules originally developed under the more restrictive
review provisions of the EAA.230 It might even be possible to ar-
gue in the context of an IEEPA challenge that the extension of
the EAA licensing regime contemplated in the October Initiative
exceeds the powers granted in the EAA--even though that claim
would be difficult, albeit not impossible,23" ' to bring under the
EAA itself.
Third, it may be significant that IEEPA imposes in 50 USC
section 1702 a limit on the President's authority, one designed to
protect the free flow of ideas:
The authority granted to the President by [the part of
IEEPA that grants sweeping power to control exports
during a national emergency] does not include the au-
thority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly...
the exportation to any country, whether commercial or
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmis-
sion, of any information or informational materials,
See note 214 and accompanying text.
See John Ellicott, et al, Judicial Review Under Export Laws in Evan R. Berlack
and Cecil Hunt, eds, Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1994 at 353, 371 (PLI Commercial
Law and Practice Series A-705, 1994).
" See id at 362-67; Bozarov v United States, 974 F2d 1037 (9th Cir 1992); Dart v
United States, 848 F2d 217 (DC Cir 1988).
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including but not limited to microfiche, tapes, compact
disks, CD ROMs, artworks and news wire feeds." 2
In turn, this restriction on the President's sweeping authori-
ty to control exports under IEEPA is itself subject to an excep-
tion: "The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by
this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise con-
trolled for export under section 5 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979,J[2.] or under section 6 of such Act,[2 ] to the ex-
tent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or
antiterrorism policies of the United States ....
There are two ways one might read this. On the one hand,
IEEPA's reference to the EAA could be an incorporation by refer-
ence. In this reading, the President's IEEPA powers are unaffect-
ed by subsequent changes in the EAA. Indeed, it matters not
whether the EAA is amended or expires-whatever powers were
contained in the EAA when the relevant portion of IEEPA was
last enacted236 remain reserved to the President. This reading is
buttressed by the so-called "Lazarus Rule""2 7 under which spe-
cific references to a statute survive that statute's repeal.238 Any
other rule, the Supreme Court explained in Kendall v. United
States, would create uncertainty "as to what was the law; and
would be adopting prospectively, all changes that might be made
in the law."
239
Alternately, IEEPA's reference to the EAA could be under-
stood as a Congressional decision that its protection of the free
flow of ideas is not intended to disrupt the export controls
scheme "otherwise" authorized by the EAA, and that if there is
no such scheme then there is no IEEPA exception either. In this
reading, if the EAA were amended to increase the government's
authority to impose export controls, the President's IEEPA au-
thority would automatically increase as well. On the other hand,
232 50 USC § 1702(b) (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
232 Codified at 50 USC App § 2404 (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
234 Codified at 50 USC App § 2406 (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
"' 50 USC § 1702(b)(3) (1988 and Supp IV 1992).
As it happens, the most recent amendment of 50 USC § 1702(b)(3) occurred on
April 30, 1994. See Pub L 03-226, Title V, Part A, § 525(c)(1), 108 Stat 474.
17 See Note, "Lazarus Come Forth. And He that Was Dead Came Forth." An Exami-
nation of the Lazarus Rule: Fischer v. City of Grand Island, 26 Creighton L Rev 221
(1992).
21 See, for example, Kendall v United States, 37 US (12 Pet) 524, 624-25 (1838). See
also Note, 26 Creighton L Rev at 228-29 (cited in note 237) (collecting authorities).
3 Kendall, 37 US (12 Pet) at 624 (1838) (cited in note 238).
IT CAME FROM PLANET CLIPPER
if the EAA lapses or is repealed, the President's IEEPA authority
shrinks accordingly. While this might seem to lead straight to the
evil that the Supreme Court warned against in Kendall, it is
important to note that the statutes at issue there referred to the
laws of foreign jurisdictions. When Congress makes reference to
its own laws, the justification for the "Lazarus Rule" is consider-
ably reduced because the danger of prospective adoption of rules
of unknown content under the control of other sovereigns is elim-
inated.2" Furthermore, the dangers of uncertainty and unin-
tended consequences seem tenuous indeed when Congress is
amending laws which are well cross-indexed.
Both the word "otherwise" and the structure of IEEPA sug-
gest that the purpose of the limitations in section 1702 was to
ensure that the President has no power to restrict the exchange
of information and ideas, while leaving intact regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the EAA. Since the EAA has lapsed by its own
terms, the legislative intent behind the EAA, and arguably
IEEPA also, might best be effectuated by a finding that IEEPA
does not allow the government to restrict the export of "informa-
tion or informational materials," a term that would probably
include DES software,24' once those come off the USML. There
are, however, no cases of which I am aware which address this
issue, and it is likely to be the subject of litigation unless and
until Congress renews the EAA.
240 See generally Note, 26 Creighton L Rev at 236 (cited in note 238) (arguing that leg-
islative intent should usually control).
241 Whether a program is "information or informational materials" as opposed to a
mere device is debated. One court has held that cryptographic source code is speech. See
Bernstein v United States, 922 F Supp 1426 (ND Cal 1996). But see Karn v United States,
925 F Supp 1 (D DC 1996). The Karn decision is currently under appeal to the D.C.
Circuit.
